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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
OAKLAND DIVISION**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, *et al.*

Case No. 4:17-cv-5783-HSG

Plaintiffs,

STATE OF OREGON

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

V

ALEX M. AZAR, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, *et al.*

**DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN  
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, OR  
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Hearing Date: September 5, 2019

Time: 2 p.m.

## Courtroom: Two, Fourth Floor

Judge: Hon. Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.

Defendants,  
and

## THE LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR, JEANNE JUGAN RESIDENCE, *et al.*

### Defendant-Intervenors.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

For the reasons stated below, as well as the reasons explained in Federal Defendants' opening brief, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or in The Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. (Defs.' SJ Mem.), ECF No. 366, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and grant Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

## **ARGUMENT**

## I. The ACA Authorizes the Rules

Plaintiffs misinterpret the scope of the ACA’s statutory mandate. *See* States’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Mots. for Summ. J., (Pls.’ Opp.) at 8, ECF No. 385. The term “shall” imposes a mandatory obligation on covered plans to cover the identified preventive services, but it does not limit HRSA’s (that is, HHS’s) authority to decide both what preventive services must be covered and by what categories of regulated entities.<sup>1</sup> As previously explained, the ACA’s delegation of authority to HRSA (a component of HHS) authorized the Rules. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring that certain health plans and health insurance issuers cover “with respect to women” such “additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the [HRSA]”). Plaintiffs misconstrue Federal Defendants’ position as “seek[ing] to expand th[e] narrow delegation of authority” of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) “into the ability to exempt any and all employers from the statutory mandate.” Pls.’ Opp. at 8. But the Final Rules do no such thing—they exempt only those with sincerely held religious and moral beliefs from the mandate, the authority for which derives from § 300gg-13(a) and from RFRA. *See* Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 13-28.

Plaintiffs' contrary interpretation of the ACA cannot possibly be correct, for, if it were, that would doom not only the Rules, but also the prior exemption for churches and their integrated

<sup>1</sup> In its recent ruling affirming the preliminary injunction from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit also noted that “[t]he term ‘shall’ denotes a requirement.” *Pennsylvania v. President United States*, No. 17-3752, 2019 WL 3057657, at \*13 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019), as amended (July 18, 2019). Federal Defendants do not disagree that “shall” denotes a requirement, but dispute the scope of that requirement along the lines described here and in their previous filings.

1 auxiliaries. Plaintiffs assert that the authority for the church exemption “does not emanate from  
 2 the Women’s Health Amendment” at all, *see* Pls.’ Opp. at 13, but they provide no alternative basis  
 3 for it. *See id.* They also attempt to dismiss the relevance of the church exemption by noting that  
 4 it “imported a long-standing and narrowly tailored category of employers defined in the Internal  
 5 Revenue Code.” *Id.* But it is § 300gg-13(a) that authorizes the exemption for churches and their  
 6 integrated auxiliaries, not the Internal Revenue Code. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code  
 7 provisions Plaintiffs cite, 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(i) & (iii), are wholly unrelated to the  
 8 provision of contraceptive coverage. Although the Agencies borrowed the definition of a “religious  
 9 employer” from § 6033 when exercising their authority under 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) to provide  
 10 the exemption for churches and their integrated auxiliaries, nothing in § 6033 serves as an  
 11 independent source of authority for the government to create the exemptions at issue here. Given  
 12 the absence of any plausible contrary source of authority, it is clear that the authority for the church  
 13 exemption and the Final Rules are the same.

14 The church exemption is thus fully relevant here because it illustrates the unreasonable  
 15 breadth of Plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation. Where an interpretation would produce an absurd  
 16 result, or an “unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,” it  
 17 should be rejected. *United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns*, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (internal  
 18 quotation omitted). Plaintiffs’ interpretation—under which HRSA could determine only the  
 19 content but not the scope of coverage—would sweep away the prior exemptions along with the  
 20 ones challenged here. *See* Pls.’ Opp. at 8-12. That would be a decidedly unreasonable outcome  
 21 and the Court should construe the statute to avoid it.

22 Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants’ position means that “Congress [acted] sub silentio,” *see*  
 23 *id.* at 8, but that ignores statutory text indicating the preventive-services requirement applies only  
 24 “as provided for” and “supported by” HRSA’s guidelines. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).  
 25 Similarly, unlike the other provisions of the statute, § 300gg-13(a)(4) refers to “comprehensive  
 26 guidelines” that did not exist at the time of the ACA’s enactment—the statute thus left to HHS’s  
 27 discretion what, and to what extent, those guidelines provide for and support particular coverage

1 by particular entities. Since their first rulemaking on this subject in 2011, the Agencies have  
 2 consistently interpreted the broad delegation to HRSA in § 300gg-13(a)(4) to include the authority  
 3 to reconcile the ACA’s preventive-services requirement with sincerely held views of conscience  
 4 on the sensitive subject of contraceptive coverage by exempting churches and their integrated  
 5 auxiliaries from the contraceptive-coverage mandate. *See* 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3,  
 6 2011). (Notably, the church exemption has varied through time, as the Agencies responded to  
 7 evidence that such exemption did not actually resolve conscience objections and exercised their  
 8 discretion to balance competing interests, as they have also done in these Rules.) Any contrary  
 9 interpretation would require scrapping both the Final Rules and the church exemption.

10 Plaintiffs also suggest that Congress’s inclusion of the exemption for grandfathered plans  
 11 and for religious exemptions in other ACA mandates suggests that Congress disfavored other  
 12 exemptions, Pls.’ Opp. at 10, 38, but that is also incorrect. Plaintiffs’ argument relies on the canon  
 13 of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, *i.e.*, that the inclusion of certain exemptions to the ACA  
 14 precludes the possibility that the Agencies could create the Rules. Pls.’ Opp. at 38. But “[t]he  
 15 force of any negative implication . . . depends on context,” and that presumption can apply only  
 16 when “circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to  
 17 be excluded.” *NLRB v. Sw. Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (citations and quotation marks  
 18 omitted). No such inference is sensible here, where the ACA’s legislative history suggests that  
 19 religious and moral objections to providing contraceptive coverage fall within the category of  
 20 unresolved questions that Congress left to the Agencies. *See* 158 Cong. Rec. S485 (Feb. 9, 2012)  
 21 (urging Congress to “wait until there is at least a rule we can talk about” before addressing “first  
 22 amendment” concerns). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, this canon is “an especially feeble  
 23 helper in an administrative setting, where Congress is presumed to have left to reasonable agency  
 24 discretion questions that it has not directly resolved.” *Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA*, 853 F.3d 527,  
 25 534 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting *Cheney R. Co. v. ICC*, 902 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). None of  
 26 the *expressio unius* cases Plaintiffs cite arises from the regulatory context.

1       In *Hillman v. Maretta*, 569 U.S. 483 (2013), cited by Plaintiffs, the Supreme Court was  
 2 interpreting a single paragraph containing an express exemption, and that context may have  
 3 reasonably suggested that Congress did not intend other exemptions. Pls.’ Opp. at 10 (quoting  
 4 *Hillman*, 569 U.S. at 496). No such implication is warranted, however, with respect to the ACA’s  
 5 preventive-services provision, when Congress was well aware that it had delegated authority  
 6 relating to the scope of the provision to HRSA, and when Congress had declined to require that  
 7 contraceptive coverage be included in HRSA’s guidelines at all. Indeed, the exemption for  
 8 grandfathered plans is an umbrella provision of the ACA that is not tied to § 300gg-13(a)(4), and  
 9 thus provides no insight into HRSA’s discretion under that provision. Even more, the  
 10 grandfathering clause’s inclusion, without any exception to grandfathering for contraceptive  
 11 coverage, indicates that cost-free contraceptive coverage was not to be guaranteed at all costs.

12       Plaintiffs also incorrectly seek support from a proposed, but not enacted, conscience  
 13 amendment to the ACA. Pls.’ Opp. at 12. But failed legislation is a nullity, and Congress’s failure  
 14 to adopt a proposal can be a “particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation” of  
 15 a statute. *Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.*, 511 U.S. 164, 187  
 16 (1994). And contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that accommodating religious and moral liberty is  
 17 at odds with the intent of the ACA, Opp. at 11-12, the reality is that, “under the A[CA],  
 18 longstanding Federal laws to protect conscience (such as the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 300a-  
 19 7, and the Weldon Amendment, section 508(d)(1) of Public Law 111-8) remain intact,” Executive  
 20 Order 13535, March 24, 2010—a preservation of protections that is in keeping with our nation’s  
 21 highest ideals.

22       In short, the Agencies had authority to promulgate the Rules under the Women’s Health  
 23 Amendment. And at the very least, in light of this statutory and regulatory backdrop, the Agencies’  
 24 exercise of authority to expand the exemption is a reasonable construction of the statute entitled to  
 25 deference. *See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).

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28

1           **II. RFRA Authorizes and Compels the Religious Exemption Rule<sup>2</sup>**

2           Although Plaintiffs present a bevy of objections to Federal Defendants' RFRA arguments,  
 3 they elide the central flaw in their argument—if it was acceptable for the Agencies to use their  
 4 authority under RFRA to create the exception for churches and their integrated auxiliaries, and  
 5 then again to create the accommodation process, why would the Agencies' use of that same  
 6 authority to implement the Religious Exemption Rule be any different?

7           As Federal Defendants have previously explained, Defs.' SJ Mem. at 21-32, the Religious  
 8 Exemption Rule comprises the Agencies' solution to alleviate the substantial burden placed on  
 9 some employers even after the accommodation (as RFRA requires) and to alleviate the substantial  
 10 burden identified by the Supreme Court in *Hobby Lobby* (as RFRA permits, given that RFRA does  
 11 not require that the Agencies take any particular response to remove a substantial burden).  
 12 Plaintiffs continue to maintain that Congress enacted RFRA's mandate yet left the government  
 13 with no power to actually comply with RFRA once it was aware of substantial burdens on religious  
 14 exercise, but that position is facially untenable.<sup>3</sup>

15

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16           <sup>2</sup> Plaintiffs rely on evidence outside the administrative record to support their claims. This is  
 17 improper for the reasons discussed in Federal Defendants' brief on the appropriate scope of the  
 18 record. ECF No. 279. Moreover, the declarations submitted by Plaintiffs should also be  
 19 rejected to the extent they (1) speculate about whether entities should find contraceptive  
 20 coverage religiously or morally objectionable, Decl. of Phyllis C. Borzi, ECF No. 385-3, ¶ 22  
 21 (concluding that the “accommodation separates the objecting employer from the provision of  
 22 contraceptive coverage”), or (2) opine on the wisdom of the Agencies' policy judgment, Decl. of  
 23 Rev. Susan Russell, ECF No. 385-74, ¶ 6 (“For these reasons, the Clergy Advocacy Board  
 24 condemns the Trump administration's attempts to use morality and religion to undermine access  
 25 to contraception.”). These are not appropriate topics for declarations. *See, e.g., Soremekun v.*  
*Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Conclusory, speculative testimony in  
 26 affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary  
 27 judgment.”); Wright & Miller, 10B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2738 (4th ed.) (“Thus, ultimate or  
 28 conclusory facts and conclusions of law, as well as statements made on belief or on information  
 and belief, cannot be utilized on a summary-judgment motion.”) (quotation marks and footnotes  
 omitted).

<sup>3</sup> The Third Circuit's recent decision states: “[N]either of the statutes upon which the Agencies  
 rely, the ACA and RFRA, authorize or require the Final Rules.” *Pennsylvania v. President  
 United States*, No. 17-3752, 2019 WL 3057657, at \*13. But the opinion is devoid of any

A. RFRA Authorizes the Government to Affirmatively Avoid Substantially Burdening Religious Exercise, Which Includes the Authority to Grant Exemptions

3 As Federal Defendants have previously explained, Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 28-32, RFRA  
4 authorizes the government to act to eliminate substantial burdens on the exercise of religion unless  
5 the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. RFRA’s  
6 text is clear: “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the  
7 burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).” 42 U.S.C.  
8 § 2000bb-1(a); *cf.* Pls.’ Opp. at 15 (“RFRA provides that the federal government cannot  
9 substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.”). The most natural interpretation of this  
10 provision is that—as Congress said—the government shall not impose such unwarranted burdens  
11 on religious practice. Plaintiffs’ contrary interpretation, Pls.’ Opp. at 30-34, would re-write RFRA  
12 to mean something like: “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion  
13 *once a court has told the government, with regard to that precise person, to stop.*”

14 The actual RFRA statute also provides for judicial relief: “A person whose religious  
15 exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or  
16 defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C.  
17 § 2000bb-1(c). This provision makes clear that judicial relief is an option once the government  
18 has already “violat[ed]” RFRA, and that governmental *compliance* with RFRA will avoid such  
19 undue substantial burdens on religious exercise and thus will not require the involvement of the  
20 courts. It is perfectly logical to conclude that Congress gave agencies the authority to cure their  
21 own imposition of substantial burdens in the first instance, while also providing for judicial review  
22 as a means of further ensuring the protection of religious liberty, especially since Congress  
23 provided that “[n]othing in this chapter [RFRA] shall be construed to authorize any government

explanation for its conclusion that RFRA does not *authorize* the Religious Exemption Rule, so it does not constitute persuasive authority on that point. As discussed in this brief and Federal Defendants' opening brief, RFRA does, in fact, authorize the Religious Exemption Rule. Moreover, for the reasons stated in Federal Defendants' prior briefing, RFRA also requires the Religious Exemption Rule.

1 to burden any religious belief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(c). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ implication, Pls.’  
 2 Opp. at 31, judicial review and agency-created exemptions can live side by side.

3 As Federal Defendants have previously noted, their interpretation is also the most logical  
 4 one. The Agencies should not need to “await a lawsuit before they bring their actions into  
 5 compliance with the law.” Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 28-29. Plaintiffs characterize this as a “red herring,”  
 6 Pls.’ Opp. at 32, but continue to maintain that the Agencies’ hands are tied until a court has ordered  
 7 them to comply with the law. *See id.* at 32 (“[T]he plain language of RFRA requires a  
 8 determination as to whether a government action constitutes a ‘substantial burden,’ which, as  
 9 explained, is a legal determination for the courts.”). Plaintiffs’ only reasoning in support of this  
 10 position appears to be their theory that *only* a court is capable of determining when a substantial  
 11 burden on religious exercise exists. *Id.* But not only would it be “cumbersome” to wait on myriad  
 12 lawsuits (and potentially expensive given the attorney’s fees provision applicable to RFRA, *see* 42  
 13 U.S.C. § 1988(b)), *id.*, it would also be unlawful for the Agencies to continuously and knowingly  
 14 violate RFRA.<sup>4</sup>

15 Plaintiffs tilt against a straw man, arguing that RFRA could not have given agencies  
 16 “unlimited authority and unchecked ‘leeway.’” Pls.’ Opp. at 30-31. Yet Federal Defendants have  
 17 never claimed unlimited and unchecked power. Federal Defendants already noted that the  
 18 Agencies are not “authorized to create any exemptions they want”—instead, arbitrary and  
 19 capricious review will still apply. Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 31-32. Plaintiffs also suggest that the  
 20 Religious Exemption Rule violates the ACA and the Establishment Clause, Pls.’ Opp. at 35-38,  
 21 but for the reasons explained below, that is not the case.

22 Plaintiffs argue that the Agencies seek the power to “choose religious winners and losers,”  
 23 *id.* at 34, but it is RFRA that requires the Agencies to alleviate undue substantial burdens,  
 24 regardless of the specific religious beliefs at issue. To the extent, of course, that others were to

25 <sup>4</sup> Plaintiffs’ citation to a case about limitations on the judicial power to rewrite statutes is  
 26 inapposite to the question of what authority Congress granted the executive agencies through  
 27 RFRA. *See* Pls.’ Opp. at 32 (citing *Puerto Rico v. Franklin California TaxFreeTrust*, 136 S. Ct.  
 1938, 1949 (2016)).

1 believe that their religious beliefs were unduly burdened, judicial review as outlined in RFRA  
 2 would be available.

3 Finally, Plaintiffs' argument that permitting the Agencies to affirmatively comply with  
 4 RFRA's strictures would violate the nondelegation doctrine, Pls.' Opp. at 32-34, is meritless. As  
 5 Plaintiffs acknowledge, Congress may delegate its law-making authority to another branch of  
 6 government so long as it provides "an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized  
 7 to [act] is directed to conform." *J.W. Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States*, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  
 8 To provide a constitutionally permissible "intelligible principle," Congress need only "clearly  
 9 delineate[] the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this  
 10 delegated authority." *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989). Here, of course,  
 11 Congress has provided just such a principle—the government may not substantially burden  
 12 religious exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling  
 13 government interest. This is more than sufficient to meet the nondelegation doctrine's  
 14 requirements, which are low, as demonstrated by the eight decades that have elapsed since the  
 15 Supreme Court last struck down a federal statute on nondelegation grounds. *Cf. Whitman v. Am.*  
 16 *Trucking Ass'ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). Indeed, none of Plaintiffs' purported examples  
 17 indicates such unchecked leeway. *See, e.g.*, Pls.' Opp. at 33 (complaining that the Agencies "can  
 18 determine whether a federal statute imposes a 'substantial burden'" under RFRA); *id.*  
 19 (complaining that the Agencies need not notify third parties when they identify a substantial  
 20 burden under RFRA).

21 Most tellingly, Plaintiffs offer no rebuttal to Federal Defendants' argument that the  
 22 accommodation itself would be improper if RFRA did not authorize agencies to create exemptions  
 23 absent specific judicial order. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 29. Indeed, Plaintiffs' suggestion that agencies  
 24 should continue to burden religious exercise until a court forces them to stop would have  
 25 foreclosed the possibility of the accommodation ever existing—the Agencies would not have been  
 26 able to proactively create the accommodation prior to lawsuits, and after a RFRA lawsuit, the  
 27 Agencies may have been forced to provide objecting employers with a total exemption instead.  
 28

1       Perhaps recognizing these flaws, Plaintiffs at times acknowledge that RFRA affirmatively  
 2 authorizes agencies to create exemptions. *See, e.g.*, Pls.’ Opp. at 30 (“To the extent RFRA grants  
 3 agencies some authority, that authority must be cabined to only those situations where authorized  
 4 to do so by RFRA, namely where there is a ‘substantial burden.’”); *id.* at 35 (“To the extent that  
 5 RFRA grants agencies some authority, that authority may only be invoked where required under  
 6 the ‘substantial burden’ framework . . . .”); *see generally id.* at 35-38. But the Religious Exemption  
 7 Rule would meet Plaintiffs’ purported limitations on the Agencies’ RFRA authority, as absent the  
 8 Religious Exemption Rule, the contraceptive mandate would impose a substantial burden on the  
 9 religious exercise of some entities.

10       B. Entities are Substantially Burdened in the Absence of the Religious  
 11                    Exemption Rule

12       Plaintiffs argue that the accommodation process avoids substantial burdens, and thus  
 13 removes the necessity for the Agencies to act further under RFRA. Pls.’ Opp. at 15-23. As Federal  
 14 Defendants previously explained, the Religious Exemption Rule is necessary to alleviate the  
 15 substantial burden on employers with “a sincere religious belief that their participation in the  
 16 accommodation process makes them morally and spiritually complicit” in providing contraceptive  
 17 coverage, because their “self-certification” triggers “the provision of objectionable coverage  
 18 through their group health plans.” *Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.*,  
 19 801 F.3d 927, 942 (8th Cir. 2015); *see also* 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,798, 47,800 (Oct. 13, 2017);  
 20 Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 22-25. Plaintiffs offer a variety of responses to this argument, none of which is  
 21 convincing.

22       First, Plaintiffs reiterate their argument that the Agencies should be powerless to cure  
 23 RFRA violations until a court has recognized the precise substantial burden that the Agencies seek  
 24 to cure. Pls.’ Opp. at 16-19. This argument fails for the reasons previously stated—RFRA  
 25 instructs the Agencies to act affirmatively to remove substantial burdens, rather than to delay and  
 26 drive each objecting entity to file its own lawsuit.

1 Plaintiffs further challenge the substantiality analysis, but it is not Federal Defendants' 2 contention that "courts must completely defer to litigants on the substantial burden question," Pls.' 3 Opp. at 17, or that agencies must do so. The Supreme Court has already addressed in *Hobby Lobby* 4 the burden imposed by the significant financial penalties that objecting entities face if they do not 5 comply with the mandate, and the Court had "little trouble" concluding that the mandate imposed 6 a substantial burden. *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 719 (2014); *see also Priests* 7 *for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.*, 808 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., 8 dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in case challenging the accommodation). That 9 conclusion dictates the conclusion here that, if the accommodation burdens religious practice, that 10 burden is substantial because the same penalties would potentially apply. Plaintiffs' arguments 11 that RFRA does not apply to "every conceivable burden—no matter how slight" and that agencies 12 should not simply defer to objectors about the substantiality of their objections are thus misplaced. 13 Pls.' Opp. at 18.

14 Plaintiffs continue to misunderstand the significance of the financial penalties, arguing that 15 because the accommodation exists, the financial penalties do not impose a substantial burden. *Id.* 16 at 19-20. The question of substantiality of the burden turns on the severity of the pressure the 17 government's action imposes on an objector to violate his religious beliefs—here, the penalties 18 that apply if an objector refuses to use the accommodation because doing so would violate the 19 objector's religious beliefs. Plaintiffs attempt to import *Hobby Lobby*'s discussion of least 20 restrictive means, *id.* at 19 (citing *Hobby Lobby*, 573 U.S. at 731), but that is a separate analysis 21 from substantial burden, and in any event, the *Hobby Lobby* plaintiffs did not object to complying 22 with the accommodation. 573 U.S. at 731. Other employers, however, do have sincere religious 23 objections to complying with the accommodation, and they face the same serious monetary 24 policies that the Supreme Court held to impose a substantial burden in *Hobby Lobby*.

25 Finally, Plaintiffs make explicit their attempts to "tell the [objectors] that their beliefs are 26 flawed," *id.* at 724, by arguing that the accommodation cannot burden anyone because the insurer 27 provides separate payments for contraceptives. Pls.' Opp. at 20-23. But this is not the correct 28

1 RFRA analysis. No one has seriously contested the sincerity of the objectors' opposition to the  
 2 accommodation, and no one can dispute the serious monetary penalties that apply to objectors who  
 3 refuse to comply with the accommodation. Plaintiffs' lengthy explanation of the role played by  
 4 insurers and third-party administrators does not address the burden placed on those employers that  
 5 object to triggering, by their certification, the provision of contraceptives through the plan they  
 6 sponsor. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,798.

7 In any event, the Religious Exemption Rule is the Agencies' response to two separate  
 8 substantial burdens. First, it is a required response to the substantial burden of mandating that  
 9 objectors who have a sincere religious belief that self-certifying through the accommodation  
 10 process violates their religious beliefs. Second, it is a permissible response to the precise  
 11 substantial burden already identified by the Supreme Court in *Hobby Lobby*—the substantial  
 12 monetary penalties that accompany failure to comply with the mandate. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 22. As  
 13 Federal Defendants previously noted, Defs.' SJ Mem. at 29-31, RFRA does not prescribe the  
 14 precise remedy by which the government must eliminate a substantial burden, once one has been  
 15 identified. To conclude otherwise would trap the Agencies in protracted litigation until they landed  
 16 on the precise, single accommodation that would be *least* protective of the objector's religious  
 17 exercise while still surviving a RFRA lawsuit brought by the objector. RFRA did not require the  
 18 Agencies to select the accommodation—with all of its idiosyncratic features—as the one correct  
 19 response to the substantial burden identified in *Hobby Lobby*. Instead, the Agencies could have  
 20 simply offered a straightforward exemption to the objectors, as the Religious Exemption Rule  
 21 does, and nothing prevents the Agencies from doing the same now.

22                   C. Forcing the Objectors Covered by the Religious Exemption Rule to Provide  
 23                   Contraceptive Coverage is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a  
 24                   Compelling Government Interest

25                   Plaintiffs begin their compelling interest argument, Pls.' Opp. at 23-27, from the wrong  
 26 starting place, arguing that, in general “maintaining women’s seamless access to contraceptives is  
 27 a compelling government interest.” Pls.' Opp. at 23. The right question is whether a compelling  
 28

1 government interest exists in requiring the *small percentage of employers with sincere religious*  
 2 *objections to the mandate or accommodation* to violate their religious beliefs. Defs.' SJ Mem. at  
 3 25-27. As the Agencies reasonably concluded, there is not. The mandate itself is already replete  
 4 with exceptions. These exceptions include the exemption for churches and their integrated  
 5 auxiliaries, the grandfathered plan exception, and the accommodation when used by a self-insured  
 6 church plan, all of which may result in women not receiving the benefit of subsidized  
 7 contraceptives. Indeed, prior to the Religious Exemption Rule, the mandate did not appear to  
 8 result in an increase in the use of most effective or moderately effective methods of contraception  
 9 (except for a small increase in implant use), and thus the size of the benefit from the contraceptive  
 10 coverage mandate is questionable. *Id.* at 26. Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that the magnitude  
 11 of any governmental interest in the contraceptive mandate must take into account the availability  
 12 of contraceptive coverage through relatives' plans and the availability of contraceptives  
 13 themselves from other programs, and thus the only interest at stake here is in how convenient  
 14 obtaining those contraceptives would be. Pls.' Opp. at 25. Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that  
 15 requiring objecting employers to subsidize contraceptives cures gender discrimination, *id.* at 25,  
 16 but this suffers from the same flaws as their other arguments—including that any such effect is  
 17 limited by the numerous other exceptions to such a requirement on employers.

18       Although Plaintiffs present reasons why “seamless” contraceptive coverage might be  
 19 helpful, Pls.' Opp. at 25-26, they present no evidence that the Agencies ignored these reasons when  
 20 they concluded that seamlessness was not a compelling interest based on the substantial disunity  
 21 already present in the mandate. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 26 (citing 83 Fed. Reg. 57536, 57,548 (Nov.15,  
 22 2018)).

23       Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish between the numerous prior exemptions and the Religious  
 24 Exemption Rule by arguing that the exemption for churches and their integrated auxiliaries was  
 25 “narrowly drawn.” Pls.' Opp. at 26. But the Religious Exemption Rule, too, is “narrowly drawn,”  
 26 as it applies only to entities that have sincere religious objections to the mandate.

27  
 28

1 Finally, Plaintiffs do not dispute at all the Agencies' conclusion that the administrative  
 2 record does not contain adequate evidence to meet the high standard of demonstrating a compelling  
 3 interest. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 26 (citing 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,547).

4 **D. Alleged Third Party Harm Is Not a Reason to Neglect RFRA's Requirements**

5 Plaintiffs also return to their argument that RFRA contains a separate requirement barring  
 6 effects on third parties. Pls.' Opp. at 27-29. Not so. RFRA's text includes no such requirement.  
 7 Plaintiffs do not address the fact that nearly all exemptions will affect third parties, and that  
 8 Plaintiffs' argument would likewise doom the existing exemption for churches and their integrated  
 9 auxiliaries (and the accommodation when used by self-insured church plans) because both of these  
 10 existing exemptions can result in women not receiving the benefit of contraceptive coverage.  
 11 Plaintiffs cite the language of *Hobby Lobby*, *id.* at 27 (citing *Hobby Lobby*, 573 U.S. at 730 n.37),  
 12 but, as Federal Defendants have already explained, Defs.' SJ Mem. at 28 n.12, this language is  
 13 referring to the Establishment Clause analysis as explained in *Cutter v. Wilkinson*, not any  
 14 requirement of RFRA. And the Religious Exemption Rule does not violate the Establishment  
 15 Clause, as described below.

16 **III. The Agencies Engaged in Reasoned Decision-Making**

17 **A. The Agencies Reasonably Balanced Objections of Conscience Against the Net  
 18 Benefits of Contraceptives and the Mandate**

19 Plaintiffs continue to insist that the Rules are arbitrary and capricious for failing to  
 20 adequately explain and support the Agencies' position on the "safety, efficacy, and benefits" of  
 21 contraception. Pls.' Opp. at 44. This argument could find its genesis only in a studied indifference  
 22 to the preamble to the Rules, bringing to mind the Seventh Circuit's admonition that while "[t]he  
 23 ostrich is a noble animal," it is "not a proper model" for the law. *Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor  
 24 Co.*, 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2011).

25 To start, Plaintiffs boldly proclaim that Federal Defendants "dismiss the safety, efficacy,  
 26 and benefits of contraception." Pls.' Opp. at 44. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the boldness of this  
 27 proclamation outstrips its accuracy. The Rules do not "dismiss the safety, efficacy, and benefits

1 of contraception.” *Id.* Instead, they conclude that while contraceptives—and contraceptive  
 2 coverage—provide some benefits, the net benefits are less certain than previously acknowledged  
 3 and do not justify demanding that those with sincere conscience objections be required to provide  
 4 contraceptive coverage. 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,556. In other words, the Rules are focused on  
 5 establishing, as a policy matter, the proper *balance* between conscience objections and the  
 6 contraceptive coverage requirement. *Id.* They are not the unscientific mandate on contraceptives  
 7 that Plaintiffs imagine them to be.

8 Importantly, the Agencies’ decision about the proper balance between contraceptive  
 9 coverage and conscience objections is just one ground for the conclusion that applying the  
 10 contraceptive coverage mandate to objecting employers is not the least restrictive means of  
 11 furthering a compelling governmental interest as applied to those objectors. *See, e.g., id.* at 57,556.  
 12 The Agencies clearly explained the multiple, independent reasons for this conclusion, *see, e.g., id.*  
 13 at 57,547-48, including that there can be no compelling interest in the provision of contraceptive  
 14 coverage given that “the ACA does not apply the Mandate, or any part of the preventive services  
 15 coverage requirements, to grandfathered plans,” *id.* at 57,547.

16 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs focus their arguments on the Agencies’ balancing rationale, and its  
 17 component parts. For example, Plaintiffs contend that “Defendants’ assertion that it is unclear  
 18 whether the mandate has increased contraceptive use . . . is likewise unsupported by the record.”  
 19 Pls.’ Opp. at 44 (citation omitted). In doing so, however, they make several fundamental errors.

20 First, they fail to heed the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that “[a] court generally must be at  
 21 its most deferential when reviewing scientific judgments and technical analyses within the  
 22 agency’s expertise”—such as the analyses conducted by the Agencies here, 83 Fed. Reg. at  
 23 57,552–555 nn. 28-50 (citing literature on the effects of contraceptives)—and that it “may not  
 24 impose [itself] as a panel of scientists that instructs the [agency] . . . , chooses among scientific  
 25 studies . . . , and orders the agency to explain every possible scientific uncertainty.” *Tri-Valley*  
 26 *CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy*, 671 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).  
 27 Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to substitute their views of scientific and technical data for the Agencies’  
 28

1 views. To defend their approach, they argue that no deference is owed because the Agencies failed  
 2 to “give a reasoned explanation for [their] actions.” Pls.’ Opp. at 45. But this is false: There’s  
 3 nothing unreasonable about the conclusion that while contraceptives—and contraceptive  
 4 coverage—provide some benefits, the net benefits are less certain than previously acknowledged  
 5 and do not justify demanding that those with sincere conscience objections be required to provide  
 6 contraceptive coverage. 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,556.

7 Plaintiffs also contend that no deference is due because “[t]he record does not demonstrate  
 8 that Defendants actually applied any scientific or technical expertise” because they “do not take a  
 9 position on the variety of empirical questions discussed above.” Pls.’ Opp. at 46 (internal  
 10 quotations omitted). This argument too comes up short of the mark. That the Agencies did not  
 11 reach ultimate conclusions about certain empirical questions does not mean that they did not  
 12 exercise expertise in identifying the questions and recognizing that contraceptives have effects that  
 13 were not fully acknowledged in previous rulemaking. An analogy is instructive: A lawyer uses  
 14 her legal expertise when identifying the legal issues presented by a transaction, even if she does  
 15 not determine which side would have the better of the legal arguments, if ultimately litigated.  
 16 Here, the Agencies exercised their expertise, as demonstrated by, for example, their canvassing of  
 17 the literature on the medical effects of contraceptives. 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,552–55 nn. 28–50.

18 Second, Plaintiffs’ arguments related to Federal Defendants’ previous administrative  
 19 positions fail to recognize that changed factual circumstances are not a prerequisite to policy  
 20 change. *See* Pls.’ Opp. at 44–45. In *Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of*  
*Agriculture*—a case never addressed in Plaintiffs’ brief, notwithstanding Federal Defendants’  
 21 discussion of it in their opening brief, Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 34—the Ninth Circuit concluded that an  
 22 agency was entitled to “give more weight to socioeconomic concerns than it [previously] had [two  
 23 years earlier], even on precisely the same record.” 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
 24 Just so here. The record before the Agencies justified a different balancing of “the various policy  
 25 interests at stake.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,556.

1 Plaintiffs, citing *California v. Azar*, 911 F.3d 558, 577 (9th Cir. 2018), *cert denied*, 2019  
 2 WL 1207008 (2019), contend that the Ninth Circuit has already concluded that the Rules were  
 3 flawed for failing to explain what factual change drove the Agencies to conclude that “it is unclear  
 4 whether the mandate has increased contraceptive use,” Pls.’ Opp. at 44. But the Ninth Circuit did  
 5 no such thing. Rather, it addressed whether the Agencies had adequately justified the need to act  
 6 initially through interim final rules. *California*, 911 F.3d at 577. Moreover, under Plaintiffs’  
 7 interpretation, *California v. Azar* would require a change in factual circumstances as a prerequisite  
 8 to a policy change, and thus would be inconsistent with *Village of Kake*, an en banc decision.  
 9 Given that a panel opinion cannot overrule an en banc decision (absent special circumstances not  
 10 present here), Plaintiffs’ interpretation should be rejected for that reason as well. *See Rotec Indus.,*  
 11 *Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.*, 348 F.3d 1116, 1122 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A three-judge panel generally  
 12 has no power to overrule a decision of this court.”).

13 Finally, Plaintiffs erroneously contend that the Rules are arbitrary and capricious because  
 14 “Defendants’ assertion that it is not clear that the Exemption Rules will have a significant effect .  
 15 . . . conflicts with their own determination that over 100,000 women will be impacted and their prior  
 16 determination that the coverage requirement is necessary to address healthcare inequities.” Pls.’  
 17 Opp. at 45 (citation omitted). They insist, in other words, that the Agencies have made conflicting  
 18 factual findings. *Id.*

19 This argument is flawed. Whether the Rules will have a “significant effect” is a policy  
 20 determination, not a factual finding: Significance cannot conclusively be proven or disproven—it  
 21 is a policy judgment. And as the Agencies have not made conflicting factual findings, Plaintiffs’  
 22 argument fails at its premise. In any case, the Agencies’ judgment is legally sound. Courts review  
 23 policy determinations under the APA’s deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, *see White*  
 24 *Mem’l Med. Ctr. v. Thompson*, 11 F. App’x 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2001), and there is nothing arbitrary  
 25 or capricious about the Agencies’ decision. The Rules state that “it is not clear that merely  
 26 expanding exemptions [to contraceptive *coverage* requirements] as done in these rules will have a  
 27 significant effect on contraceptive *use*.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,556 (emphasis added). The italicized  
 28

1 words in the previous quotation are important: The supposed conflict identified by Plaintiffs  
 2 depends not only on ignoring the difference between factual findings and policy conclusions, but  
 3 on ignoring that the “significant effect” language in the rule is addressed to contraceptive use, not  
 4 coverage. The Rules explain why “it is not clear” that there will be a significant effect on  
 5 contraceptive “use”: “there is conflicting evidence regarding whether the mandate alone, as  
 6 distinct from birth control access more generally, has caused increased contraceptive use, reduced  
 7 unintended pregnancies, or eliminated workplace disparities, where all other women’s preventive  
 8 services were covered without cost sharing.” *Id.* In other words, even if 100,000 women see a  
 9 change in their contraceptive coverage, it is not clear that the difference in the number of women  
 10 using contraceptives will be significant, for the reasons identified in the previous sentence. This  
 11 is a rational conclusion.<sup>5</sup>

12                   B. The Agencies Appropriately Accounted for the Potential Costs of the Rules

13 Plaintiffs argue that the Rules are “arbitrary and capricious because Defendants failed to  
 14 “consider all the relevant factors when considering the cost of the rules.” Pls.’ Opp. at 46. In  
 15 support of this argument, Plaintiffs make three basic points: 1) the Agencies did not calculate the  
 16 exact costs of the Rules and determine who would bear these costs; 2) the Agencies “failed to take  
 17 any reasonable steps to determine the Rules’ many impacts;” and 3) the Agencies unreasonably  
 18 rejected an alternative. *Id.* at 46-47. None of these arguments has merit.

19 Plaintiffs’ untenable view of the specificity with which agencies must predict the costs of  
 20 a rule and who will bear them conflicts with blackletter administrative law, which requires only  
 21 rationality, not omniscience. *CHW W. Bay v. Thompson*, 246 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001)  
 22 (explaining that “arbitrary and capricious review under the APA focuses on the reasonableness of  
 23 an agency’s decision-making processes”) (quotation marks omitted); *cf. O’Bryant v. Idaho Dep’t*

24                   <sup>5</sup> It is also worth noting that, in making estimates of the number of women who might see a  
 25 change in their contraceptive coverage, the Agencies leaned in favor of more “broadly  
 26 estimat[ing] the possible effects of these rules.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,578. Moreover, “the number  
 27 of women covered by entities likely to make use of the expanded exemptions in these rules is  
 28 likely to be very small in comparison to the overall number of women receiving contraceptive  
 coverage as a result of the Mandate,” *id.* at 57,575, *i.e.*, a number far less than 1%, *id.* at 57,578.

1 *of Health & Welfare*, 841 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Idaho 1993) (concluding that “nothing in the APA  
 2 requires the Secretary to engage in the virtually impossible task of listing every type of benefit  
 3 which is not excluded from income”) (quotation marks omitted). If adopted, Plaintiffs’ position  
 4 would make it impossible for any rule to be issued, because no agency has a crystal ball.

5 Plaintiffs’ argument that the Agencies did not “take any reasonable steps to determine the  
 6 Rules’ many impacts,” Pls.’ Opp. at 46-47, fares no better. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that  
 7 the Agencies did not “survey regulated entities to estimate the possible impact of the Rules.” *Id.*  
 8 at 47. To the contrary, the Agencies did take “reasonable steps” to determine the Rules’ impacts.  
 9 Most notably, the Agencies solicited, accepted, and considered comments on the Rules. Contrary  
 10 to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, courts cannot impose procedural requirements—such as Plaintiffs’  
 11 proposed “survey” requirement—above and beyond those required by the APA. *Vermont Yankee*  
 12 *Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978). Under the  
 13 APA, the question is not whether Plaintiffs can envision additional procedural requirements that  
 14 they would like the Agencies to follow, *see id.*, but whether the record compiled by the Agencies  
 15 using the procedures established by the APA supports their decision. Here, the record adequately  
 16 supports the Rules.

17 Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument about the alternative not accepted by the Agencies—namely,  
 18 “that women discuss their healthcare needs, including any purported uncertainty or risks related to  
 19 contraceptives, with their personal physician,” Pls.’ Opp. at 47 (quotation marks and citations  
 20 omitted)—is a nonstarter. (This argument has no apparent relationship to the consideration of  
 21 costs, but Plaintiffs raise it in that section, and Federal Defendants will respond to it accordingly.)  
 22 Federal Defendants explained in their opening brief that this alternative is, in fact, no real  
 23 alternative because it would not “satisfy or mitigate the conscience objections to providing  
 24 contraceptive coverage.” Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 38. Plaintiffs now reply that “[t]his response confirms  
 25 that the Exemption Rules were not promulgated in response to any purported uncertainty about  
 26 contraceptives, but were issued as a desire to end ‘years of litigation.’” Pls. Opp. at 47. This is  
 27 either a non sequitur or a revealing slip: Do Plaintiffs think that conscience objections exist only

1 as abstract notions bandied about in litigation? They do not have such a limited place in the world.  
 2 They are real, and their existence means that the proposed alternative is no alternative at all.

3       C. The Rules Accord with Congressional Intent

4 Plaintiffs' arguments that the Rules diverge from congressional intent has two parts; they  
 5 are equally meritless. The first part is a rehash of their argument that the ACA does not authorize  
 6 the Rules. There is no need to restate the problems with that argument here. The second part is  
 7 an argument that the Agencies have "act[ed] arbitrarily and capriciously [by] . . . ignor[ing] [their]  
 8 own experts' advice." Pls.' Opp. at 48. The Agencies did not reject their "own experts' advice."  
 9 Rather, the Agencies reached a different decision on certain issues, including medical issues, than  
 10 some commenters that had advised them in the past. But, under Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court  
 11 should defer to the Agencies' view of scientific and technical questions, not the view of Plaintiffs  
 12 or of commenters whom they favor. *See Tri-Valley CAREs*, 671 F.3d at 1124. Moreover, in the  
 13 decisions cited by Plaintiffs, the courts did not conclude that an agency acts arbitrarily and  
 14 capriciously by ignoring its own experts' advice, rather, they concluded that the administrative  
 15 record lacked evidence to support the agencies' decisions. *See Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's*  
 16 *Ass'ns, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 265 F.3d 1028, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2001); *see also*  
 17 *Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse*, 305 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, however, the  
 18 record supports the Agencies' decisions, as explained in the opening brief and this brief.

19       D. The Rules Are Properly Tailored

20 Plaintiffs complain that the Rules are not "narrowly tailored to the problems they are  
 21 intended to address." Pls.' Opp. at 48. The problems with this argument, and the points made in  
 22 support of it, are legion.

23       First, there is no "narrow[ ]" tailoring requirement under the APA—arbitrary and  
 24 capricious review is not strict scrutiny. *See Assoc. Dog Clubs of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Vilsack*, 75 F.  
 25 Supp. 3d 83, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) ("The APA does not, in any event, require agencies to tailor their  
 26 regulations as narrowly as possible to the specific concerns that generated them."). Indeed,  
 27 introduction of the "narrow" tailoring argument is new to this brief, as Plaintiffs' opening brief  
 28

1 argues that there is a “serious lack of alignment” between the Rules and the problems they are  
 2 aimed at. Pls.’ Opp. at 45. That argument fares no better. Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 40-42.

3 Second, in response to Federal Defendants’ assertion that the Rules are adequately tailored  
 4 to address “how best to balance conscience objections with the provision of contraceptive  
 5 coverage,” Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 41, Plaintiffs again oddly interpret this interest simply as “a ‘desire  
 6 to avoid litigation’” and intone that it is not a “rational basis for rulemaking,” Pls.’ Opp. at 48.  
 7 But a desire to bring to an end years of litigation was only one of the reasons that prompted the  
 8 Agencies to reexamine the scope of exemptions for religious objectors to the contraceptive  
 9 mandate. Among others was the interest in respecting objections of conscience, which is not the  
 10 same as a desire to avoid litigation. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has stated, for example, that “we of  
 11 course acknowledge that eliminating RFRA violations by reducing the burden on religious beliefs  
 12 is an important consideration for the agencies. Any delay in rectifying violations of statutory rights  
 13 has the potential to do real harm.” *California*, 911 F.3d at 577.

14 Third, Plaintiffs continue to argue that “there is no evidence justifying the broad scope of  
 15 the Religious or Moral Exemption Rules because there is no evidence that certain employers need  
 16 the Rules.” Pls.’ Opp. at 49. More specifically, Plaintiffs complain about the extension of the  
 17 Religious Exemption Rule to publicly traded companies and the application of the Moral  
 18 Exemption Rule to any entity. In re-raising this argument, Plaintiffs fail to grapple with the  
 19 fundamental flaws in the argument highlighted in the Federal Defendants’ last brief. Defs.’ SJ  
 20 Mem. at 41-42. If the Rules create exemptions for entities that will never use them, then Plaintiffs  
 21 have no standing to challenge that aspect of the exemptions because they do not face any imminent  
 22 harm. If, on the other hand, the exemptions are invoked, then Plaintiffs’ argument that the  
 23 exemptions are unnecessary is wrong. Plaintiffs cite cases in which courts concluded, more or  
 24 less, that rules were arbitrary and capricious because they were unnecessary. Pls.’ Opp. at 49. But,  
 25 in those cases, unlike this one, the plaintiffs were hurt by the unnecessary rules.<sup>6</sup>

26  
 27 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs argue that the alleged harm caused by the Rules “is compounded by the fact that  
 28 under the Rules, employers need not give *any* notice to the government or their employees so

E. The Agencies Adequately Responded to Comments Regarding the Potential Burdens on Women

Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants once again summarily dismiss significant comments addressing the negative health impacts and financial burdens of the Rules.” Pls.’ Opp. at 50. This argument lacks merit. The Rules do not summarily discount the comments regarding the potential burdens on women referenced by Plaintiffs. To the contrary, the Rules spend more than a page responding to these comments. 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,548-57,550. Plaintiffs rely heavily on *Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Env’tl. Control v. EPA*, 785 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015), asserting that Defendants’ “wan responses to [the] comments” do not fulfill their “obligations under the APA to respond to ‘relevant and significant comments,’” *id.* (quotation marks omitted). *Id.* at 15-16. But the Court in that case concluded that the agency did not engage with the main point of the comments. *Id.* at 15-16. That is not the case here. The comments at issue here suggested that the Rules would cause certain negative effects, and the Agencies responded that the Rules relieve a burden on conscience previously imposed by the government and that any potential negative effects would be the product of private action. 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,549-550. Plaintiffs may not like the response, but that does not transform it into a “summar[y] dismiss[al]” of the comments, or otherwise render it inadequate.

#### IV. The Rules Do Not Violate § 1554 or § 1557 of the ACA

A. The Rules Do Not Create an Unreasonable Barrier to Obtaining Health Care

Section 1554 prohibits regulations that “*create any unreasonable barriers* to the ability of individuals to obtain appropriate health care.” 42 U.S.C. § 18114(1) (emphasis added). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ strained reading of the statute, Pls.’ Opp. at 41, “creating” something requires an

neither the public nor the government will ever know the extent to which employers are utilizing the Rules, depriving women of their healthcare benefits.” Pls.’ Opp. at 50 n.24. This statement is misleading. While an objecting employer need not provide notice to its employees that it is invoking one of the exemptions, under ERISA, employers must inform employees of changes to their plans, including changes to contraceptive coverage. *See* 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a), (b); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3.

1 affirmative act. The Supreme Court has recognized this common-sense distinction by  
 2 differentiating between actions that affirmatively impede the public's ability to engage in an  
 3 activity, and decisions to decline to subsidize that activity. *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 200–  
 4 01 (1991); *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). Plaintiffs' brief reviews the out-of-pocket  
 5 costs of obtaining a variety of forms of contraceptives, and notes that certain women may be  
 6 required to absorb these costs or switch to a less expensive (and effective) form of contraception  
 7 as a result of price pressure. Pls.' Opp. at 40–41. But the Agencies did not “create” through  
 8 regulation the costs of contraceptives, and the Rules impose no barriers, cost or otherwise, on any  
 9 woman who wishes to obtain contraceptives. Rather, the Rules create exemptions that narrow the  
 10 scope of employers subject to the contraceptive-coverage requirement, which, as already noted,  
 11 was not required by the preventive-services mandate in the first place. These Rules accordingly  
 12 do not thwart the purposes of the preventive-services mandate, as Plaintiffs contend, *id.* at 39. No  
 13 legislative scheme “pursues its purposes at all costs,” *Rodriguez v. United States*, 480 U.S. 522,  
 14 525–26 (1987), and the exemptions reflected in these Rules apply to only a small subset of  
 15 employers. Finally, as explained above, even if the Court concludes the Rules impose “barriers”  
 16 to coverage, those barriers are not “unreasonable” ones in light of the substantial burden on  
 17 religious exercise the contraceptive-coverage requirement creates and the numerous exemptions  
 18 to the requirement that already exist in law.

19 Plaintiffs rely upon a spate of recent decisions from district courts within the Ninth Circuit  
 20 that applied § 1554 to temporarily block HHS's newly promulgated Title X rules. *See* Pls.' Opp.  
 21 at 39. Plaintiffs characterize the Ninth Circuit's decision to stay these rulings as based on “other  
 22 grounds” because the Ninth Circuit has not concluded that § 1554 is unenforceable. Nonetheless,  
 23 what the Ninth Circuit has done does not support Plaintiffs' position, either. The panel held “that  
 24 § 1554 does not affect § 1008's prohibition on funding programs where abortion is a method of  
 25 family planning” because “there is a clear distinction between affirmatively impeding or  
 26 interfering with something, and refusing to subsidize it.” *California v. Azar*, 927 F.3d 1068, 1078  
 27 (9th Cir. 2019). Although this panel opinion can no longer be cited as precedent in light of the  
 28

1 Ninth Circuit's grant of en banc review, *see* 927 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. July 3, 2019), the en banc  
 2 court has subsequently refused to set aside the panel's order staying the preliminary injunctions of  
 3 these district courts, 928 F. 3d 1153 (9th Cir. July 11, 2019). The en banc court's decision to allow  
 4 the new Title X regulations to go into effect casts, at a minimum, serious doubt on the viability of  
 5 the Plaintiffs' legal arguments regarding § 1554. As such, the Court should hold that the Rules do  
 6 not fall afoul of § 1554.

7                   B. The Rules Do Not Discriminate Against Women

8                   The Agencies' opening brief explained that because the Rules "do not discriminate on the  
 9 basis of sex, facially or otherwise," they do not violate § 1557 of the ACA, which prohibits the  
 10 government from excluding, denying, or discriminating against individuals "on the grounds"  
 11 prohibited by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and  
 12 the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Plaintiffs assert that the Agencies have  
 13 "wholly failed" to respond to their argument under § 1557 because it is a "separate claim" from an  
 14 equal protection claim. Pls.' Opp. at 42. But Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that a  
 15 § 1557 claim differs substantively in terms of what constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.  
 16 In fact, at least one case they cite agrees that these inquiries are identical. *Flack v. Wis. Dep't of*  
 17 *Health Servs.*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (noting, in addressing Equal Protection  
 18 claim, that court had "already found that plaintiffs have made a strong showing of sex  
 19 discrimination" in their § 1557 claim, which the court analyzed first). If the Agencies show that  
 20 the Rules do not discriminate on the basis of sex—and, as explained in greater detail in the  
 21 Agencies' discussion of Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, they do not—then Plaintiffs cannot  
 22 prevail on a § 1557 claim, either.

23                   Plaintiffs also assert in support of their § 1557 claim that the Agencies' failure to create  
 24 exemptions to other preventive service mandates on religious grounds, such as religious objections  
 25 to vaccinations or to medication derived from pigs, demonstrates that the Agencies must have  
 26 discriminatory intent. That is a red herring. Neither the court in *Real Alternatives v. U.S. Dep't*  
 27

1 *of Health & Human Servs.*, 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017), nor the Plaintiffs, put forward any  
 2 evidence that Christian Scientists, Jews, Muslims, or Jehovah’s Witnesses have actually sought  
 3 exemptions from ACA mandates that might be objectionable to them, either through the agency  
 4 or litigation. By contrast, dozens of objectors to the contraceptive coverage mandate were engaged  
 5 in protracted litigation with the federal government over their objections to the contraceptive  
 6 coverage requirement for the better part of a decade.

7 **V. The Rules Are Constitutional**

8 **A. The Rules Comport with the Establishment Clause**

9 Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims also fail. Their attempt to conflate the Rules’  
 10 accommodation of religious exercise with an impermissible promotion of religion cannot be  
 11 squared with *Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day*  
 12 *Saints v. Amos*, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), which recognized that alleviating significant governmental  
 13 inference with religious exercise is a permissible legislative purpose. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully  
 14 attempt to distinguish *Amos* on the grounds that “no reliance interests were at stake” in *Amos*. Pls.’  
 15 Opp. at 54. This attempt fails because *Amos* neither discussed reliance interests, nor stated or  
 16 implied that its outcome depended on the consideration of any such interests.

17 Neither of Plaintiffs’ two theories as to why the Rules impermissibly advance religion  
 18 possesses merit. First, Plaintiffs err in contending that the Agencies ran afoul of the Establishment  
 19 Clause by replacing an exemption that Plaintiffs believe “imposed no cognizable burden on the  
 20 exercise of religion” with the Rules. *Id.* at 51. Here, the government’s secular purpose—to  
 21 alleviate significant governmental interference with the exercise of religious and moral  
 22 convictions—is not fully served by the accommodation. *See* 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,546-48 (explaining  
 23 that requiring entities to choose between compliance with the accommodation or paying financial  
 24 penalties violated RFRA in many instances). Some entities have sincere religious objections to  
 25 the role that the accommodation forces them to play in the provision of contraceptive coverage.  
 26 Plaintiffs’ attempt to minimize these religious objections invites just what RFRA does not allow

1 and what the Supreme Court has prohibited: “it is not for [a court] to say that [an objector’s]  
 2 religious beliefs are mistaken.” *Hobby Lobby*, 573 U.S. at 725.

3 Second, from the fact that Plaintiffs disagree with the Rules’ outcome on policy grounds,  
 4 it does not follow that the Agencies “elevated the religious beliefs of objectors” over “the affected  
 5 women’s interests.” Pls.’ Opp. at 52. As explained above, the Agencies provided reasoned  
 6 explanations for the promulgation of the Rules, and responded meaningfully to comments  
 7 regarding the impact of the Rules. Plaintiffs rely on inapposite cases to support their contrary  
 8 arguments. A state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public-school curriculum  
 9 unless accompanied by lessons on creationism, at issue in *Edwards v. Aguillard*, 482 U.S. 578  
 10 (1987), is far afield from an exemption to a regulatory mandate regarding employer-provided  
 11 contraceptive coverage. Similarly inapposite is *Larkin v. Grendel’s Den*, 459 U.S. 116 (1982), in  
 12 which a state statute delegated “a power ordinarily vested in agencies of government”—the ability  
 13 to veto applications for liquor licenses within a prescribed radius—to churches and schools. *Id.* at  
 14 122; *see also id.* at 117-18. The Rules do not vest governmental functions in any entity. And  
 15 *United States v. Lee*, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), which rejected a claimed exception by an Amish  
 16 employer to his obligation to pay Social Security taxes, merely stands for the principle that “the  
 17 Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular program  
 18 by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously  
 19 compromise its ability to administer the program.” *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente*  
 20 *Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006). Because no such compelling interest in uniform  
 21 application of the mandate is present here given, among other things, the contraceptive mandate’s  
 22 numerous other exemptions, *Lee* is inapposite.

23 And as Federal Defendants’ opening brief explained, Plaintiffs err in suggesting that the  
 24 religious exemption constitutes the kind of “absolute and unqualified” exception that the Supreme  
 25 Court held unconstitutional in *Estate of Thornton v. Caldor*, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Defs.’ SJ  
 26 Mem. at 46. Unlike the Rules, the statute at issue in *Caldor* did not lift any government-imposed  
 27 burden on religion, but instead imposed on employers an “absolute duty” to allow employees to  
 28

1 be excused from work on “the Sabbath [day] the employee unilaterally designate[d],” thereby  
 2 intruding on private relationships and interfering with private contracts. *Caldor*, 472 U.S. at 709.  
 3 By contrast, the lifting of a *government-imposed* burden on religious exercise is permitted under  
 4 the accommodation doctrine referenced in *Amos*. *See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock*, 489 U.S. 1,  
 5 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that “the application of Title VII’s exemption for  
 6 religious organizations that we approved in [Amos], *though it had some adverse effect* on those  
 7 holding or seeking employment with those organizations (if not on taxpayers generally), prevented  
 8 potentially serious encroachments on protected religious freedoms”) (emphasis added). The  
 9 existence of that doctrine explains why Plaintiffs are mistaken in responding that Federal  
 10 Defendants’ argument would render unconstitutional Title VII’s religious exemption to the  
 11 prohibition against religious discrimination in employment. Pls.’ Opp. at 53 n.26. That exemption  
 12 eliminates the government-imposed burden on religion that Title VII’s prohibition of religious  
 13 discrimination in employment would otherwise impose on certain religious employers absent an  
 14 accommodation. Here—as in *Amos*, and unlike in *Caldor*—the promulgation of the Rules is  
 15 necessary to prevent potentially serious encroachments on the exercise of religious (and moral)  
 16 convictions.

17 As Federal Defendants’ opening brief explained, before the mandate, women had no  
 18 entitlement to contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing; thus, if the same Agencies that created  
 19 and enforce the mandate also create a limited exemption to accommodate sincere religious  
 20 objections, the women affected are not “burdened” in a meaningful sense, because they are no  
 21 worse off than before the Agencies chose to act in the first instance. Defs.’ SJ Mem. at 44-45.  
 22 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that there is “little support” for this conclusion, Pls.’ Opp. at 53,  
 23 it is supported by *Amos*, which explained that although the plaintiff was “[u]ndoubtedly” adversely  
 24 affected by the termination of his employment, “it was the [Mormon] Church[,] not the  
 25 Government, who put him to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job.” 483  
 26 U.S. at 337 n.15. Instead of burdening the Church’s employees, the religious exemption simply  
 27 left them where they were before Title VII’s general prohibition and exemption had been enacted.  
 28

1       Finally, as Federal Defendants have explained, any adverse effects from the Rules result  
 2 from a decision by private employers, and not the government; the burden at issue is much less  
 3 than the loss of employment (as in *Amos*), as it is merely the loss of subsidized contraceptive  
 4 coverage by an employer with sincerely-held religious or moral objections to providing such  
 5 coverage. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 45. And though Plaintiffs respond by arguing that this conclusion  
 6 does not take into account the importance of subsidized contraceptive coverage, Pls.' Opp. at 54  
 7 n.28, their reasoning fails to account for the fact that Congress did not require such coverage in  
 8 the first place. Moreover, if accepted, this reasoning would also invalidate the church exemption.

9                   B. Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Arguments Lack Merit

10       The Rules are consistent with principles of equal protection. As Federal Defendants' opening brief explained, the ACA's provision requiring coverage for additional preventive services supported by HRSA pertains only to such services for "women." Defs.' SJ Mem. at 49 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). Accordingly, the Rules and HRSA Guidelines generally require coverage for female contraceptives—while providing an exemption for those with religious and conscience objections—but do not require any coverage of male contraceptives. *See id.* Consequently, the Rules do not treat men more favorably than women, and any sex-based distinctions flow from the statute, which requires preventive services for women only.

18       As Federal Defendants' opening brief also explained, Plaintiffs have cited no authority that  
 19 declining to require subsidization of contraception constitutes a sex-based equal protection  
 20 violation. Defs.' SJ Mem. at 49.<sup>7</sup> Nor do Plaintiffs cast doubt on the above-stated conclusions.  
 21 Pls.' Opp. at 55-56. Initially, Plaintiffs allege that the provision requiring coverage for additional  
 22 preventive services for women was motivated by a desire to remedy inequities in the provision of  
 23 health care to men and women. *Id.* at 55. Even if correct, it remains the case that the ACA  
 24 provision itself requires only coverage of female contraceptives. Consequently, the Rules neither

25       <sup>7</sup> Plaintiffs' sole response under this rubric is to make one "threshold" and one "secondary"  
 26 argument related to the general nature of the operation of the Rules and the accommodation, Pls.'  
 27 Opp. at 56 n.29, while continuing to fail to cite any authority that declining to require  
 28 subsidization of contraception constitutes an equal protection violation.

1 create any sex-based distinction nor treat men more favorably than women. Instead, Plaintiffs’  
 2 assert that the “*result of the[] Rules*” will be that women will “not receiv[e] equal healthcare  
 3 benefits”—in other words, despite the fact that the Rules do not draw any sex-based distinction,  
 4 the exemption to subsidizing contraceptive coverage disproportionately affects women. *Id.* Such a claim  
 5 does not state a cognizable equal protection claim on the basis of sex, which can be based only on  
 6 a showing of discriminatory intent.

7 Nor do Plaintiffs remedy this deficiency by noting that the exemption to subsidizing  
 8 contraceptive coverage “burdens women unequally” because it applies only to the Women’s  
 9 Health Amendment, which is one of five subparts to the ACA’s preventive-services mandate. *Id.*  
 10 at 55-56. It remains true that the Rules themselves neither create any sex-based distinction nor  
 11 treat men more favorably than women. And an allegation that a legal provision “burdens women  
 12 unequally” is clearly a disparate-impact claim, which equal-protection principles do not recognize.

13 Under the Rules, any distinctions in coverage among women are not premised on sex, but  
 14 on the existence of an employer’s religious or moral objection to facilitating the provision of  
 15 contraceptives. Plaintiffs’ rejoinder that “the *ability* of employers to exclude coverage for women  
 16 is a result of the Rules,” Pls.’ Opp. at 56, once again, states only a disparate-impact claim.  
 17 Specifically, Plaintiffs are contending that despite the fact that the preventive-services mandate  
 18 only subsidizes female contraception, and the Rules draw no sex-based distinctions, as “a *result of*  
 19 the Rules,” “women’s access to healthcare” is disproportionately affected in comparison with men’s  
 20 access to healthcare. *Id.* But disparate impact does not state a sex-based equal protection violation.  
 21 Finally, nothing in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), supports Plaintiffs’ equal  
 22 protection claim; the Supreme Court has long distinguished between government *interference* with  
 23 individual rights, and the government’s decision *not to subsidize* or enhance the exercise of such  
 24 rights. *See, e.g., Rust*, 500 U.S. 173; *Harris*, 448 U.S. 297.

25 Because the Rules relate rationally to the legitimate governmental interests in  
 26 accommodating religious and moral beliefs, they are consistent with equal-protection principles.  
 27  
 28

## **VI. The Agencies Complied with the APA's Procedural Requirements**

In the Final Rules, the Agencies made numerous changes to the exemptions proposed in the IFRs in response to public comments. Plaintiffs argue that this was insufficient because “[t]hey were never afforded an unbiased comment period,” and suggest that if the Agencies “want to promulgate the same Rules, they must issue a NPRM, take comments on that proposal, and then issue a final rule.” Pls.’ Opp. at 58. But this approach could not possibly assuage Plaintiffs’ concerns that the Agencies will “read[] comments with an open mind.” *Id.* Taken to its logical conclusion, Plaintiffs’ position would prevent agencies from ever issuing rules substantively similar to those tainted by an initial procedural error. The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ attempt to turn the APA’s procedural requirements into a permanent roadblock to rulemaking.

Plaintiffs' argument hinges on Third Circuit case law, which that court recently addressed in *Pennsylvania v. Trump*. Relying on *NRDC v. EPA*, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982), and *Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA*, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit held that the Agencies' actions did "not reflect any real open-mindedness toward the position set forth in the IFRs" because the government did not change the "fundamental substance of the exemptions" and relied on the same reasons for issuing the Final Rules that it used to issue the IFRs. *Pennsylvania*, 2019 WL 3057657, at \*12. These determinations are meritless. "While changes and revisions are indicative of an open mind," the inverse is not true; "an agency's failure to make any [changes] does not mean its mind is closed." *Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin.*, 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Indeed, "[a]n agency is not required to adopt a rule that conforms in any way to the comments presented to it. So long as it explains its reasons, it may adopt a rule that all commentators think is stupid or unnecessary." *Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan*, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to invalidate navel orange volume restrictions issued by the agency in violation of the APA under the "harmless error" rule). Plaintiffs' disagreement with the Final Rules does not mean that the Agencies had a closed mind or did not respond meaningfully to their comments on the IFRs. *See* Pls.' Opp. at 57–58.

1       The *Pennsylvania* court also contended that the IFRs “alter[ed] the Agencies’ starting point  
 2 in considering the Final Rules.” *Pennsylvania*, 2019 WL 3057657, at \*12. But the Agencies were  
 3 not concerned with “upsetting the status quo by amending a rule only recently implemented” when  
 4 promulgating the Final Rules. *Levesque v. Block*, 723 F.2d 175, 187 (1st Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs  
 5 suggest they were prejudiced because they had to “simultaneously seek an injunction against the  
 6 IFRs *and* draft a comment,” and that the Agencies defended the IFRs in court knowing they would  
 7 be receiving comments on those rules in the future. Pls.’ Opp. at 58. These forms of prejudice are  
 8 not germane to the concerns that animate the “open mind” test. What matters is that the IFRs had  
 9 been enjoined for nearly a year by the time the Final Rules were promulgated. Accordingly, the  
 10 Agencies could not have been concerned that, in promulgating the Final Rules, they would have  
 11 to depart from regulations they were already implementing.

12       Plaintiffs also share in *Pennsylvania*’s mischaracterization of *NRDC*. As the Agencies  
 13 explained, subsequent notice-and-comment did not cure the procedural defect of the IFRs in *NRDC*  
 14 because the public did not comment on the question of whether to “further suspend” amendments  
 15 that had already been in effect for some time; it was asked to comment on postponing amendments  
 16 that had not yet gone into effect. 683 F.2d at 768. Plaintiffs assert that there is no authority for  
 17 the Agencies’ interpretation of *NRDC*, but courts outside the Third Circuit have upheld post-  
 18 promulgation notice and comment under facts similar to those presented here. *See, e.g., Advocates*  
 19 *for Highway & Auto Safety*, 28 F.3d at 1291–93 (concluding agency provided adequate opportunity  
 20 for notice and comment on waiver program despite announcing intention to issue temporary  
 21 waivers without notice and comment); *Levesque*, 723 F.2d at 188 (agreeing that post-promulgation  
 22 comment period was adequate after interim rules were improperly issued). The Agencies have  
 23 discharged their duty to permit the public to comment on the proposed exemptions and respond to  
 24 those comments; the APA requires nothing more. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ procedural APA claim  
 25 must be rejected.

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1                   **VII. No Nationwide Injunction Should Issue**

2                   Plaintiffs argue that a nationwide injunction is mandated in this case by the APA. Pls.’  
 3 Opp. at 59–60. But as this Court explained in *City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sessions*, 349 F. Supp. 3d  
 4 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018), *appeal filed*, No. 18-1730 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2018), when considering a similar  
 5 request for a permanent nationwide injunction, such injunctions remain “discretionary relief”  
 6 under the APA. *Id.* at 971 n.7. Nationwide injunctions are only merited when they are “necessary  
 7 to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.” *Bresgal v. Brock*, 843 F.2d 1163,  
 8 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit observed previously, it “is  
 9 not necessarily the case” that a nationwide injunction is required to provide prevailing plaintiffs in  
 10 an APA case with complete relief.<sup>8</sup> *California*, 911 F.3d at 584. That is because the APA’s  
 11 mandate of a “set aside” must be read in light of traditional equity practice and Article III standing  
 12 principles, which limit “plaintiff’s remedy . . . to the inadequacy that produced his injury in fact”  
 13 in order to maintain “the Court’s constitutionally prescribed role . . . to vindicate the individual  
 14 rights of the people appearing before it.” *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930, 1933 (2017).  
 15 Plaintiffs’ ability to identify cases where this test was satisfied does not mean this case is an  
 16 appropriate candidate for a nationwide injunction. As was the case at the preliminary injunction  
 17 stage, a plaintiff-protective injunction is sufficient to redress Plaintiffs’ injury, and is therefore the  
 18 appropriate remedy should Plaintiffs prevail on the merits.

19                   **CONCLUSION**

20                   For the reasons stated above and in Federal Defendants’ opening brief, the Court should  
 21 dismiss this suit or, in the alternative, enter judgment in favor of Federal Defendants.

22                   Dated: August 1, 2019

23                   Respectfully submitted,

24                   JOSEPH H. HUNT  
 25                   Assistant Attorney General

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 27                   <sup>8</sup> The Third Circuit did not consider these Ninth Circuit decisions, including the decision in  
 28                   *California*, in affirming the nationwide injunction entered by the district court in that case.  
 29                   *Pennsylvania*, 2019 WL 3057657, at \*17–18.

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