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10  
11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
12 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**  
13 **AT SPOKANE**

14 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

15 NO. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP

16 Plaintiffs,

17 v.  
18  
19 PLAINTIFF STATES' MOTION  
20 FOR § 705 STAY PENDING  
21 JUDICIAL REVIEW OR FOR  
22 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT  
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

NOTED FOR: OCTOBER 3, 2019  
With Oral Argument at 10:00 a.m.

Defendants.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

On August 14, 2019, Defendants (collectively, DHS) issued a Final Rule that will cause hundreds of thousands of families in the Plaintiff States, and millions of eligible children and adults nationwide, to disenroll from federal and state health care, nutrition, and housing benefits programs. This, in turn, will result in State residents losing hundreds of millions of dollars in health care services, decreased vaccinations and increased transmission of communicable diseases, and denied access for people with disabilities to services only available through Medicaid. It will increase hunger, malnutrition, and homelessness among children, all associated with deficits in cognitive development, chronic asthma, substance abuse, depression, and behavioral challenges. As demonstrated by the 51 declarations submitted with this motion, DHS's Rule will undermine the mission of dozens of state programs and impose millions of dollars in costs to the Plaintiff States to address the resulting public health problems, educational burdens, and homelessness.

The Plaintiff States move to stay the Rule pending judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, or alternatively for a preliminary injunction prohibiting DHS from implementing the Rule, which is scheduled to take effect on October 15, 2019. Through the Rule, the Administration attempts to remake the “public charge” doctrine, a rarely used statutory ground for exclusion of immigrants, into—in its own words—a “transformative” tool to reshape

1 American immigration policy. The Plaintiff States are likely to succeed on the  
 2 merits of their claims for a host of reasons:

3 First, DHS interprets the term “public charge” in a manner contrary to  
 4 Congress’s intent, as evidenced by statutory text, history, and context.

5 Second, DHS brazenly adopts a legal standard that Congress twice  
 6 expressly rejected, “coopt[ing] Congress’s power to legislate” through executive  
 7 action. *City & County of San Francisco v. Trump*, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir.  
 8 2018).

9 Third, the Rule separately violates four statutes: (1) the Immigration and  
 10 Nationality Act of 1952, (2) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  
 11 Responsibility Act of 1996, (3) the Personal Responsibility and Work  
 12 Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

13 Fourth, the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because DHS failed to  
 14 meaningfully address evidence of the harm the Rule inflicts on vulnerable people,  
 15 especially children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities, and DHS  
 16 ignored its own evidence that the factors it prescribed for the public charge  
 17 analysis are arbitrary, ill-defined, and give unreasonable discretion to  
 18 immigration officials.

19 DHS’s unlawful efforts to refashion American immigration policy through  
 20 regulation should not take effect while the Plaintiff States’ legal challenge is  
 21 pending.

## II. BACKGROUND

## A. Overview of Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires certain immigrants to prove that they are “not inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). A noncitizen who is “likely at any time to become a public charge” is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).<sup>1</sup> This “public charge exclusion” is enforced abroad by consular officers (who process visa applications) and domestically by Defendant USCIS. It applies to:

- noncitizens seeking to become lawful permanent residents;
  - immigrants entering the United States on a visa;<sup>2</sup>
  - noncitizens applying to “adjust” status to lawful permanent residency (*i.e.*, apply for a green card); and
  - permanent residents “seeking admission” (including, among other circumstances, when a permanent resident returns to the United States after a trip of more than 180 days).

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(c), 1182(a), 1225(a), 1255(a), 1361.

<sup>1</sup> Certain groups of noncitizens, such as asylum seekers and refugees, are exempt from the public charge ground. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(3), 1158(b)(2), 1159(c).

<sup>2</sup> Visa holders undergo an inadmissibility determination by DHS at ports of entry every time they enter and re-enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(d).

1      **B. History of the Public Charge Exclusion**

2      From colonial “poor laws” through modern times, the term “public charge”  
 3      has had a clear and established meaning: a person unable to care for himself or  
 4      herself and primarily dependent on the state for support. *See Minor Myers III, A*  
 5      *Redistributive Role for Local Government*, 36 Urb. Law. 753, 773 (2004)  
 6      (colonial poor laws permitted towns to expel transient beggars, vagrants, and  
 7      paupers as “public charges”); Gerald L. Neuman, *The Lost Century of American*  
 8      *Immigration Law (1776-1875)*, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1846 (1993); Hidetaki  
 9      Hirota, *Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States and the Nineteenth-Century*  
 10     *Origins of American Immigration Policy* (2017) (mass European migration in the  
 11     early 19th century brought “large numbers of exceptionally impoverished and  
 12     destitute people” who were described, in common parlance and law, as “public  
 13     charges,” “paupers,” or both); Immigration Act of 1882, 47th Cong., ch. 376, 22  
 14     Stat. 214 (1882) (borrowing from state immigration laws, to prohibit the landing  
 15     in the United States of “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any other person unable to  
 16     take care of himself . . . without becoming a public charge”); 26 Stat. 1084, 1084  
 17     (1891) (adding “paupers” to the list so that the provision precluded admission of  
 18     “idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”).

19      When Congress reorganized immigration law into the present statutory  
 20     framework, the INA retained the long-established exclusions of “paupers” and  
 21     those “likely at any time to become a public charge,” along with numerous other  
 22

1 grounds of inadmissibility—including for those with “a mental defect,” “physical  
 2 defect,” disease,” or “disability . . . of such a nature that it may affect the ability  
 3 of the alien to earn a living.” Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter)  
 4 Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (codified as amended  
 5 at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, *et seq.*).<sup>3</sup>

6 **C. DHS’s Public Charge Rule**

7 On August 12, 2019, DHS issued a Final Rule designed to “transform”<sup>4</sup>  
 8 who may immigrate to the United States, by expanding the previously rarely used  
 9 “public charge” exclusion.<sup>5</sup> Final Rule, *Inadmissibility on Public Charge*

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10

11 <sup>3</sup> The Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated all of the above grounds of  
 12 inadmissibility, with the exception of the public charge exclusion. Pub. L. No.  
 13 101-649, § 601(a)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5072 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.  
 14 § 1182).

15 <sup>4</sup> See Eileen Sullivan & Michael D. Shear, *Trump Sees an Obstacle to*  
 16 *Getting His Way on Immigration: His Own Officials*, N.Y. Times (Apr. 14, 2019),  
 17 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/us/politics/trump-immigration-stephen-miller.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage>.

18 <sup>5</sup> Between 2000 and 2016, less than 0.2% of the more than 17 million  
 19 immigrants admitted as lawful permanent residents were denied visas on public  
 20 charge grounds. See Report of the Visa Office, 2000–2018,  
 21 <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics.html>.

1      *Grounds*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,292 (August 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.  
 2      pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248) (the Rule).<sup>6</sup> The Rule becomes effective October 15,  
 3      2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,292.

4              The Rule unmoors the public charge definition from its historic anchor in  
 5      primary dependence on the government for subsistence, and it significantly  
 6      expands the types of benefits considered in the public charge determination and  
 7      the amount of wealth an immigrant needs to remain in the country. In public  
 8      comments, many states (including the Plaintiff States) explained the devastating  
 9      impacts the proposed rule would have on the health care costs and well-being of  
 10     families of legal immigrants in their states. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl.<sup>7</sup> Exs. H, I.

11              **1.      New definition of “public charge”**

12              Contrary to the established meaning of “public charge” and Congressional  
 13     intent, the Rule redefines the term as “an alien who receives one or more public  
 14     benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month  
 15     period.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(a). Under the 12-month threshold, receipt of two  
 16    

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17              <sup>6</sup> Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent C.F.R. citations are to provisions  
 18     of the Rule to be codified and effective October 15, 2019.

19              <sup>7</sup> Plaintiff States refer throughout to declarations submitted with this  
 20     Motion by the last name of the declarant, followed by the pertinent reference to  
 21     the paragraph or exhibit number of that declaration.

1       benefits in a given month counts as two months, three benefits as three months,  
 2       and so forth—regardless of the amounts received. 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(a).

3       **2. Consideration of non-cash benefits**

4       The Rule dismisses the longstanding interpretation of the benefits that  
 5       trigger a public charge determination and casts a vastly wider net to include  
 6       common, non-cash federal benefits.<sup>8</sup> A “public benefit” includes: “(1) [a]ny  
 7       Federal state, local or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance,” including  
 8       SSI, TANF, or state “General Assistance”; (2) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance  
 9       Program (SNAP); (3) Section 8 housing assistance vouchers; (4) Section 8  
 10      project-based rental assistance; (5) Medicaid (with exceptions for benefits or  
 11      services for emergency medical conditions, under the Individuals with  
 12      Disabilities Education Act, that are school-based, to immigrants who are under  
 13      21 years of age or a woman during pregnancy); and (6) public housing under  
 14      Section 9 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b).

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17       <sup>8</sup> Between 2009 and 2012, approximately 52.2 million people in the United  
 18       States (or 21.3% of the general population) participated in one or more major  
 19       public assistance programs in a given month—including the programs swept up  
 20       in the Rule—of whom more than two-thirds participated for at least 12 months.  
 21       See Shelley K. Irving & Tracy A. Loveless, *Dynamics of Economic Well-Being*,  
 22       U.S. Census Bureau at 2–4 (May 2015).

1                   **3. “Heavily weighted factors” and other wealth-related criteria**

2                   The Rule creates new heavily weighted factors in determining whether a  
 3                   noncitizen is a public charge, placing heavily negative weight on poverty. The  
 4                   Rule establishes four factors having heavily negative weight:

- 5                   1. the immigrant is not a full-time student and is authorized to work,  
 6                   but is unable to demonstrate current or recent employment, or no  
 7                   reasonable prospect of future employment;
- 8                   2. the immigrant has received or has been certified or approved to  
 9                   receive one or more public benefits for more than 12 months in the  
 10                  aggregate within any 36-month period;
- 11                  3. (A) the immigrant has been diagnosed with a medical condition that  
 12                  likely will require extensive medical treatment or will interfere with  
 13                  his or her ability to attend work or school; and (B) he or she is  
 14                  uninsured and has no prospect of obtaining private health insurance  
 15                  nor the financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical  
 16                  costs;
- 17                  4. the immigrant has been previously found to be inadmissible or  
 18                  deportable on public charge grounds.

19                   8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c)(1)(i)–(iv).

20                   Other wealth-related criteria the Rule introduces include whether the  
 21                  immigrant (1) is under the age of 18 or over the minimum early retirement age  
 22                  for social security; (2) has a medical condition that will require extensive  
 23                  treatment or interfere with the ability to attend school or work; (3) has an annual  
 24                  household gross income under 125% of the Federal poverty guidelines (FPG);  
 25                  (4) has a household size that makes the immigrant likely to become a public  
 26                  charge at any time in the future; (5) lacks significant assets, like savings accounts,

1 stocks, bonds, or real estate; (6) lacks sufficient assets and resources to cover  
 2 reasonably foreseeable medical costs; (7) has any financial liabilities; (8) has  
 3 applied for, been certified to receive, or received public benefits after October  
 4 15, 2019; (9) has applied for or has received a USCIS fee waiver for an  
 5 immigration benefit request; (10) has a lower credit history and credit score;  
 6 (11) lacks private health insurance or other resources to cover reasonably  
 7 foreseeable medical costs; (12) lacks a high school diploma (or equivalent) or a  
 8 higher education degree; or (13) is not proficient in English. 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(b).

9 Heavily weighted positive factors also evaluate wealth and include  
 10 whether (1) the immigrant's household income, assets, or resources are at least  
 11 250% of the FPG; (2) the immigrant legally works with an annual income at least  
 12 250% of the FPG; and (3) the immigrant has private health insurance, except for  
 13 any health insurance for which there are tax credits under the Affordable Care  
 14 Act. 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c)(2)(i)-(iii).

15 **4. Changes in bond requirements**

16 If DHS determines a noncitizen likely to become a public charge, it  
 17 nevertheless may allow the person to obtain a visa by submitting a public charge  
 18 bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1183. The Rule increases the bond amount more than eight-fold,  
 19 to \$8,100. 8 C.F.R. § 213.1(c)(2). The Rule also severely limits the use of bonds,  
 20 which "generally will not" be allowed if an immigrant "has one or more heavily  
 21 weighted negative factors." 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,451.

1                   **5. Failure to address costs to states**

2                   Despite the Rule’s impact on states’ health care plans, housing programs,  
 3                   and supplemental nutrition programs, DHS submitted no federalism summary  
 4                   impact statement and asserted that the Rule “does not have substantial effects on  
 5                   the States.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,481; *see also id.* at 41,469–70 (dismissing the  
 6                   costs to state and local government as “unclear” and “indirect”).

7                   **D. The Plaintiff States Will Suffer Immediate and Irreparable Harm**

8                   **1. The Rule will chill State residents from participating in state  
 9                   and federal benefit programs**

10                  If the Rule goes into effect, millions of legally present noncitizens  
 11                  nationwide could be subject to public charge determinations. Bays Decl. Ex. A;  
 12                  84 Fed. Reg. at 41,417 (admitting that more working immigrants with incomes  
 13                  below the 125% threshold will be determined a public charge); *see also* Bays  
 14                  Decl. Ex. B (in 2017, approximately 380,000 individuals adjusted their  
 15                  immigration status in a manner that likely would have subjected them to a public  
 16                  charge determination under the Rule). Currently, over 6.3 million noncitizens  
 17                  nationwide accept public benefits as defined by the Rule making them subject to  
 18                  a public charge determination, including 233,000 individuals in Illinois, 192,000  
 19                  individuals in Massachusetts, 188,000 individuals in New Jersey, 92,000  
 20                  individuals in Maryland, 78,000 individuals in Michigan, and 75,000 individuals  
 21                  in Washington. Bays Decl. Ex. G.

1           DHS concedes that the Rule will have a chilling effect on immigrants'  
 2           willingness to seek public benefits for which they are entitled. 84 Fed. Reg. at  
 3           41,312. Immigrants fearing deportation will disenroll from state and federal  
 4           public benefit programs to avoid the potential classification as a public charge.  
 5           See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,463 (estimating a 2.5% disenrollment rate from programs  
 6           included in the new public charge test); *id.* at 51,266–69 (agreeing that the Rule  
 7           will cause hundreds of thousands of eligible individuals who are members of  
 8           households with foreign-born noncitizens to disenroll from or forego enrollment  
 9           in benefits for which they eligible).

10           In reality, the number of noncitizens who will be chilled from using state  
 11           or federal public benefits is much higher than DHS's estimates and is expected  
 12           to range between 15% and 35% among noncitizens. Bays Decl. Exs. C, D, E  
 13           (reflecting up to 60% disenrollment, even for noncitizens who were exempted  
 14           from restrictions on access to those benefits); Wong Decl. ¶¶ 27–29, 32–34  
 15           (studies in related areas of immigration show that, when threatened with  
 16           deportation, statistically significant numbers of immigrants will disenroll or not  
 17           participate in benefit programs related to health, food, and housing). Nationwide,  
 18           there are over 10.3 million noncitizens in families receiving at least one cash or  
 19           noncash benefit whom the Rule may cause to disenroll in the applicable program,  
 20           including 424,000 individuals in Illinois, 335,000 individuals in New Jersey,  
 21           255,000 individuals in Massachusetts, 245,000 individuals in Washington,  
 22

1 182,000 individuals in Maryland, 148,000 individuals in Virginia, 116,000  
 2 individuals in Michigan, and 114,000 individuals in Nevada. Bays Decl. Ex. G.

3 **2. Anticipated disenrollment will cause concrete irreparable  
 4 harm to the Plaintiff States**

5 Nearly all of the benefits programs identified in the Rule are administered  
 6 by the Plaintiff States, who provide additional funding to many of these  
 7 programs. *See, e.g.*, Linke Decl. ¶ 8; Sharfstein Decl. ¶ 10; Emerson Decl. ¶ 10.  
 8 The Plaintiff States also have adopted their own programs to provide additional  
 9 health care, nutrition, and housing benefits. The Rule causes three types of  
 10 irreparable injury to the Plaintiff States in connection with these expenditures:  
 11 (1) harm to missions of state benefits programs; (2) harm to the health and  
 12 well-being of state residents; and (3) financial harm to the Plaintiff States.

13 **a. Health care**

14 The Plaintiff States combine billions of dollars of federal funds from  
 15 Medicaid with billions of dollars of state funds to administer health care programs  
 16 for millions of people in their states. Linke Decl. ¶ 8; Sharfstein Decl. ¶ 10;  
 17 Emerson Decl. ¶ 10; Neira Decl. ¶ 7. The predicted disenrollment from Medicaid  
 18 and other state health care programs will undermine the purpose of these  
 19 programs and frustrate the will of the Plaintiff States' legislatures that enacted  
 20 them. Linke Decl. ¶¶ 22–25; Sharfstein Decl. ¶¶ 14–16; Betts Decl. ¶ 14; Ezike  
 21 Decl. ¶ 14; MacEwan Decl. ¶ 7; Persichilli Decl. ¶ 11.

1           The Plaintiff States expect millions of people receiving Medicaid coverage  
 2 to disenroll because of the Rule. Linke Decl. ¶¶ 17–18; Boyle Decl. ¶ 29;  
 3 Kelly Decl. ¶ 15; Eagleson Decl. ¶ 10; Whitley Decl. ¶ 12; *see* Bays Decl. Ex. C.  
 4 Millions of families will also be impacted where a member of the household falls  
 5 under the policy. Linke Decl. ¶ 18; Kelly Decl. ¶ 15; Curtatone & Skipper Decl.  
 6 ¶ 12; Chavez Decl. ¶ 11; Winders Decl. ¶ 12; *see* Bays Decl. Ex. C. Nationwide,  
 7 over 9.5 million noncitizens are in families receiving Medicaid or CHIP  
 8 benefits. Bays Decl. Ex. G. The effects will be particularly harsh on the Plaintiff  
 9 States' programs for women, infants, and children, for which participation rates  
 10 have already decreased since the Rule was first made public. Polk Decl. ¶ 19;  
 11 Sharfstein Decl. ¶ 16; Hanulcik Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11–20; Bohanan Decl. ¶¶ 13, 19, 22;  
 12 Kelly, Decl. ¶ 13; Zimmerman Decl. ¶ 13; Neira Decl. ¶ 9. The result will be an  
 13 annual reduction in medical and behavioral care received by residents of the  
 14 Plaintiff States. Pryor Decl. ¶ 9; Sharfstein Decl., ¶ 15; Boyle Decl. ¶ 30;  
 15 MacEwan Decl. ¶¶ 10–13; Berge Decl. ¶¶ 14–17; Groff Decl. ¶¶ 16–17; Clark  
 16 Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Batayola Decl. ¶ 23; Basta Decl. ¶ 8; Twite Decl. ¶¶ 11–12. The  
 17 financial value of foregone health care currently received by residents of the  
 18 Plaintiff States is projected in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Bays Decl.  
 19 Ex. I at 2. The loss of medical care and health care insurance will seriously impact  
 20 the health and well-being of residents of the Plaintiff States. Sharfstein Decl.  
 21 ¶ 23; Hanulcik Decl. ¶ 19; Batayola Decl. ¶ 14; Hotrum-Lopez Decl. ¶ 6 at 8.  
 22

1       It will deter eligible individuals from accessing routine preventative medical care  
 2       like vaccinations. Polk Decl. ¶ 13; Sharfstein Decl. ¶¶ 17–18; Kelly Decl. ¶ 17;  
 3       Persichilli Decl. ¶¶ 20–22.

4           As DHS admits, Plaintiff States will suffer higher and more frequent  
 5       emergency services and uncompensated care costs. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,384;  
 6       Sharfstein Decl. ¶ 19; Persichilli Decl. ¶¶ 7–11. Not only will individuals' health  
 7       suffer, but treatment will be significantly more expensive than if people received  
 8       care before emergencies materialized; these costs will be borne by the Plaintiff  
 9       States and private institutions located in the Plaintiff States. Hou Decl. ¶ 22;  
 10       Sharfstein Decl. ¶¶ 19–22; Fehrenbach Decl. ¶ 36; Emerson Decl. ¶ 16. The Rule  
 11       thus shifts the costs to the States to pay for the public health problems it creates.

12           **b. Food assistance**

13           The Plaintiff States and local governments manage and administer food  
 14       assistance programs using federal funds that will be undermined by the Rule.  
 15       Peterson Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 8; Storen Decl. ¶ 5. While the Rule considers only  
 16       SNAP-related benefits as “public benefits” under the public charge test, the broad  
 17       chilling effect will harm state-only food assistance programs, too. Predicted  
 18       disenrollment of tens of thousands of eligible residents from the state  
 19       supplemental nutrition programs and SNAP benefits will undermine the purpose  
 20       of these programs and frustrate the will of the legislatures of the Plaintiff States  
 21       that enacted these programs. Sharfstein Decl. ¶ 23; Hou Decl. ¶ 27;

1 Perry Decl. ¶ 17; Peterson Decl. ¶¶ 10, 15; Neira Decl. ¶ 12. The impacts will  
 2 lead to more vulnerable people experiencing food insecurity and severe public  
 3 health concerns. Storen Decl. ¶ 9; Fehrenbach Decl. ¶ 33; Curtatone & Skipper  
 4 Decl. ¶¶ 12–13; Neira Decl. ¶ 18; Sternberg Decl. ¶ 6. The Rule thus not only  
 5 undermines the Plaintiff States’ interest in healthy, stable, and productive  
 6 residents, but also contradicts the purported goal of the Rule itself to “better  
 7 ensure” that immigrants “are self-sufficient, i.e., do not depend on public  
 8 resources to meet their needs.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295.

9 The chilling and disenrollment will particularly hurt children, who as a  
 10 result of malnutrition and hunger are more likely to suffer deficits in cognitive  
 11 development, behavioral problems, and poor health. Polk Decl. ¶ 19; Medrano  
 12 Decl. ¶ 13; Oliver Decl. ¶ 22; Bayatola Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 34.  
 13 Children will have more difficulty in school and require greater resources from  
 14 the Plaintiff States’ educational systems. Polk Decl. ¶ 22; Bohanan Decl. ¶ 14;  
 15 Tahiliani Decl. ¶ 7. The Plaintiff States will bear the brunt of higher health care  
 16 and other costs resulting from the unnecessary malnutrition.

17 The Rule will reduce combined food and cash assistance to families by  
 18 tens of millions of dollars. *E.g.*, Hou Decl. ¶ 21. With reduced assistance, grocers  
 19 will see lower sales, and farmers may see lower prices with decreased demand.  
 20 Hanulcik Decl. ¶ 13. The Plaintiff States will also bear the public health costs as  
 21 more individuals suffer from malnutrition and hunger, and ultimately, a less

1       productive workforce. Hou Decl. ¶ 23; Peterson Decl. ¶ 13; Hundley Decl. ¶ 15;  
 2       Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 16.

3                   **c.     Housing assistance**

4       The Rule will undermine the efficacy of housing assistance programs. The  
 5       Rule will undercut the Plaintiff States' programs aimed at housing assistance and  
 6       homelessness prevention. Ohle Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 9, 15–19;  
 7       Curtatone & Skipper Decl. ¶ 10; Baumtrog Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7–8; RI-Doe Decl. ¶¶ 19–  
 8       21; Carey Decl. ¶ 11; Johnston Decl. ¶ 7; Grossman Decl. ¶ 9; Fitzgerald Decl.  
 9       ¶ 10; Persichilli Decl. ¶ 30. This will harm the Plaintiff States' abilities to fight  
 10      homelessness.

11       The Rule will lead to increased homeless individuals and families in the  
 12      Plaintiff States, and poorer health, educational, and other outcomes for vulnerable  
 13      children residing in the Plaintiff States and who, because of their or a family  
 14      member's immigration status, will be deprived of emergency shelter or  
 15      placement in permanent housing. Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 12; Ohle Decl. ¶ 14;  
 16      Baumtrog Decl. ¶ 12; Carey Decl. ¶ 12; Johnston Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14; Grossman Decl.  
 17      ¶¶ 15–16; Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 11, 25, 30. In the first few years after moving to the  
 18      United States, many immigrants benefit from temporary assistance to adjust to  
 19      rental housing markets. *See* Bays Decl., Ex. S at 20–22 (noting that the Rule  
 20      “ignores the fact that public programs are often used as work supports which  
 21      empower future self-sufficiency”); Grossman Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11–12. Without these  
 22

1 temporary benefits, immigrant workers employed in low wage fields will be  
 2 unable to afford current market-based rents. Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 28, 31; Baumtrog  
 3 Decl. ¶ 12; Carey Decl. ¶ 12; Grossman Decl. ¶¶ 9–10, 16. For instance, demand  
 4 for long term services and support workers, in which the labor force includes a  
 5 disproportionate number of immigrants, is expected to grow because of an aging  
 6 population. Moss Decl. ¶¶ 9–16. Children who have lost their homes will suffer  
 7 worse educational outcomes and access fewer and less profitable work  
 8 opportunities. Bourque Decl. ¶ 7; Curtatone & Skipper Decl. ¶ 15; Korte Decl.  
 9 ¶ 23; Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 37–38.

10 This homelessness and housing insecurity will irreparably harm the  
 11 families, children, and the Plaintiff States, which will ultimately bear  
 12 responsibility for the increased costs and consequences of the Rule. Ohle Decl.  
 13 ¶ 13; Bourque Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Curtatone & Skipper Decl. ¶ 16; Baumtrog Decl.  
 14 ¶¶ 13–14; RI-Doe Decl. ¶ 43; Carey Decl. ¶ 13; Johnston Decl. ¶¶ 13–15; Rubin  
 15 Decl. ¶¶ 35–36. The Plaintiff States will bear the economic costs of the resulting  
 16 homelessness of families, including public health and safety costs. Bourque Decl.  
 17 ¶ 8; Curtatone & Skipper Decl. ¶¶ 15–16; Baumtrog Decl. ¶¶ 13–15; Johnston  
 18 Decl. ¶¶ 13–15; Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 12, 42–48; Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 20.

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### III. ARGUMENT

## A. Legal Standards

## 1. Administrative Procedure Act § 705 stay standards

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes this Court to stay the effective date of the Rule pending judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (“On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court . . . may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.”); *see also Texas v. EPA*, 829 F.3d 405, 424, 435 (5th Cir. 2016); *Bakersfield City Sch. Dist. of Kern Cty. v. Boyer*, 610 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1979); *Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Bd. v. United States Fed. Trade Comm’n*, No. 19-CV-214-BAJ-RLB, 2019 WL 3412162, at \*2 (M.D. La. July 29, 2019).

The purpose of Section 705 is to allow courts “to maintain the status quo . . . . The authority granted is equitable and should be used by both agencies and courts to prevent irreparable injury or afford parties an adequate judicial remedy.” *Bauer v. DeVos*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting APA, Pub. L. 1944–46, S. Doc. No. 248, at 277 (1946)); *id.* at 106–07; *see also Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act* 105 (1947) (“The function of such a power is, as heretofore, to make judicial review effective”). <https://ia600406.us.archive.org/30/items/AttorneyGeneralsManual>

1      [OnTheAdministrativeProcedureActOf1947/AttorneyGeneralsManualOnTheAd](#)  
 2      [ministrativeProcedureActOf1947.pdf](#).<sup>9</sup>

3      The same traditional equitable factors governing a motion for a  
 4      preliminary injunction apply to an application for a Section 705 stay:  
 5      (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) the balance of  
 6      equities; and (4) the public interest. *See Texas*, 829 F.3d at 424, 435;  
 7      *Humane Soc'y of United States v. Gutierrez*, 558 F.3d 896, 896 (9th Cir. 2009);  
 8      *Schwartz v. Covington*, 341 F.2d 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1965); *Assoc. Sec. Corp. v.*  
 9      *SEC*, 283 F.2d 773, 774–75 (10th Cir. 1960); *Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n*  
 10     *v. Fed. Power Comm'n*, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam); *see also* *Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 919 F.2d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The  
 11     standard is the same whether a preliminary injunction against agency  
 12     action . . . or a stay of that action is being sought . . .”).

14     Courts sometimes treat preliminary injunctions under Rule 65 and stays  
 15     under Section 705 as interchangeable. *See Colorado Coal. for Homeless v. Gen*  
 16     *Servs. Admin.*, No. 18-CV-1008-WJM-KLM, 2018 WL 3109087, at \*1 (D. Colo.

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18     <sup>9</sup> “The Supreme Court accords deference to the interpretations of APA  
 19     provisions contained in the *Attorney General's Manual*, both because it was  
 20     issued contemporaneously with the passage of the APA and because of the  
 21     significant role played by the Justice Department in drafting the APA.”  
 22     *Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick*, 813 F.2d 1006, 1012 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).

1 2018) (“The Coalition explicitly moves for a preliminary injunction under  
 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Because this case seeks review of agency  
 3 action under the APA, the proper authority for preliminary relief is 5 U.S.C. §  
 4 705: the public interest.”); *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump*, 354 F. Supp. 3d  
 5 1094, 1119 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

6 **2. Preliminary injunction standards**

7 “A party can obtain a preliminary injunction by showing that (1) it is likely  
 8 to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence  
 9 of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and (4) an  
 10 injunction is in the public interest.” *Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.*, 869  
 11 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotations and citations omitted); *see also Winter*  
 12 *v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Under the Ninth Circuit’s  
 13 “sliding scale” approach, these elements are “balanced, so that a stronger  
 14 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” *Hernandez v.*  
 15 *Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotations and citations omitted).<sup>10</sup>

16 **B. The Plaintiff States Are Likely to Succeed on Their APA Claims**

17 The Plaintiff States are likely to prevail on three of their core claims. First,  
 18 the Rule’s expansive new definition of “public charge”—on which the entirety  
 19

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20 <sup>10</sup> The “sliding scale” approach has been criticized as inconsistent with  
 21 *Winter*. *See Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.*, 571 F.3d 1288, 1296 (D.C.  
 22 Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

1 of the Rule is premised—deviates from the plain meaning of the statutory term,  
 2 and therefore must be invalidated at Step One of the *Chevron* framework.  
 3 *See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  
 4 Second, the Rule is contrary to law because it adopts an interpretation of “public  
 5 charge” that had been expressly rejected by Congress, and its weighted factor test  
 6 is contrary to the (i) “totality of circumstances” test mandated by INA Section  
 7 212(a)(4), (ii) Welfare Reform Act, and (iii) Rehabilitation Act. Third, the Rule  
 8 is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to address evidence of the harm it  
 9 inflicts on vulnerable people, and it includes factors in its public charge test that  
 10 are unrelated to—and at times at odds with—its purported purpose.<sup>11</sup>

11 **1. DHS’s new definition of “public charge” is inconsistent with  
 12 the term’s plain meaning and is contrary to law**

13 The Rule redefines “public charge” to mean “an alien who receives one or  
 14 more public benefits” above the 12-month threshold. 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(a).  
 15 DHS’s definition fails *Chevron* Step One because it is irreconcilable with the  
 16 clear meaning of the term “public charge” as demonstrated by its text, history,  
 17 and context.

18 \_\_\_\_\_

19 <sup>11</sup> Because the Plaintiff States are entitled to a stay or a preliminary  
 20 injunction on the APA claims, this motion need not address the Plaintiff States’  
 21 other claim. *E.g., Versaterm Inc. v. City of Seattle*, No. C16-1217JLR, 2016 WL  
 22 4793239, at \*5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2016).

1                   **a.     *Chevron* framework**

2                   In reviewing an agency’s implementation of a statute, courts follow a  
 3                   two-step approach. *Chevron*, 467 U.S. 842–44; *Empire Health Found. for Valley*  
 4                   *Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Price*, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1145 (E.D. Wash. 2018). First,  
 5                   using the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” the court first determines  
 6                   whether “the intent of Congress is clear.” *Id.* at 842 & n.9; *FDA v. Brown &*  
 7                   *Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Brown & Williamson)*, 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)  
 8                   (“traditional tools” include the statute’s text, history, structure, “context”—  
 9                   including its place among other statutes enacted previously or “subsequently”—  
 10                   as well as “common sense”); *Empire Health*, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 1145. If  
 11                   Congress’s intent is clear, “that is the end of the matter.” *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at  
 12                   842–43. If not, and the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific  
 13                   issue,” the court determines “whether the agency’s answer is based on a  
 14                   permissible construction of the statute.” *Id.*

15                   **b.     *Public charge* means a person primarily dependent upon  
 16                   the government for subsistence**

17                   The *Chevron* Step One inquiry into statutory meaning begins with the  
 18                   language of the statute. *Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. United States*  
 19                   *Dep’t of Agric.*, No. 2:17-CV-223-RMP, 2018 WL 2708747, at \*7 (E.D. Wash.  
 20                   June 5, 2018). The text of the original 1882 public charge exclusion provided that  
 21                   a “convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself  
 22                   without becoming a public charge . . . shall not be permitted to land.” Immigration

1      Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214. The most natural reading of “public  
 2      charge” in the 1882 statute is one who is, as the text says, “unable to take care of  
 3      himself or herself.” *Id.*

4      Because the statute does not define “public charge,” it must be presumed  
 5      that the 47th Congress intended the term to have its “ordinary or natural meaning”  
 6      in the “year [it] was enacted.” *Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t*  
 7      *of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries*, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994). The period’s most  
 8      comprehensive American dictionary defined the root word “charge” to mean  
 9      “[a]nything committed to another’s custody, care, concern, or management.”  
 10     *The Century Dictionary of the English Language* vol. IV at 929 (1889–91). This  
 11     definition is consistent with historical definitions where “public charge” was  
 12     interchangeable with “pauper.” *See id.* vol. XI at 4334 (defining “pauper” as “a  
 13     very poor person; a person entirely destitute of property or means of support;  
 14     particularly one who, on account of poverty, becomes *chargeable to the public*”)  
 15     (emphasis added); *accord* Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English*  
 16     *Language* 595 (1857).

17     This definition endured over time. *See Black’s Law Dictionary* 311 (3d ed.  
 18     1933) (defining “public charge” as “[a] person whom it is necessary to support at  
 19     public expense by reason of poverty, insanity, and poverty, disease and poverty,  
 20     or idiocy and poverty” and—as used in the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. 301,  
 21     39 Stat. 874—to include “paupers”); *Black’s Law Dictionary* 233 (6th ed. 1990)

1 (an “indigent[; a] person whom it is necessary to support at public expense by  
 2 reason of poverty alone or illness and poverty”).

3       **c. The history of the public charge exclusion confirms that  
 4           Congress adopted the term’s common law meaning**

5           **i. Colonial and early state law sources**

6       Congress adopted the public charge exclusion against a long backdrop of  
 7       colonial and state public charge laws. Because Congress based the Immigration  
 8       Act of 1882 on those earlier laws, the term “public charge” “must be construed  
 9       as they were understood at the time in the State[s].” *Shannon v. United States*,  
 10       512 U.S. 573, 581 (1994) (quoting *Capital Traction Co. v. Hof*, 174 U.S. 1, 36  
 11       (1899)).

12       In the American colonies, “public charges” were persons permanently  
 13       incapable of caring for themselves and primarily dependent on the government,  
 14       similar to a pauper. As Defendant USCIS acknowledges, due to opposition to  
 15       “the immigration of ‘paupers,’ . . . several colonies enacted protective measures  
 16       to prohibit the immigration of individuals who might become public charges.”

17       *Public Charge Provisions of Immigration Law: A Brief Historical Background*,  
 18       USCIS, [https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/public-charge-provisions-immigration-law-a-brief-historical-background#\\_ftnref1](https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/public-charge-provisions-immigration-law-a-brief-historical-background#_ftnref1) (USCIS  
 19       *Public Charge Hist. Backgr.*); see also Mass. Gen. Ct., Acts and Resolves 552,  
 20       § 2 (Mar. 14, 1700); ECF No. 31 (First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and  
 21       Injunctive Relief (FAC)) ¶ 46.

1           State laws of the 19th century reflect the same original meaning of “public  
 2 charge.” In response to mass migration of “large numbers of exceptionally  
 3 impoverished and destitute people” from Europe in the 1800s, states adopted  
 4 passenger laws limiting immigration of such persons—who were described as  
 5 “public charges,” “paupers,” or both. Hirota, *Expelling the Poor* 33; see, e.g., Act  
 6 of Mar. 20, 1850, ch. 105, § 1, 1850 Mass. Acts & Resolves 338, 339 (excluding  
 7 without a bond any “pauper, . . . destitute, or incompetent to take care of himself  
 8 or herself without becoming a public charge as a pauper”); FAC ¶ 48 (citing  
 9 similar New York, Rhode Island, and Maine laws).

10           Early cases evidence this common law understanding of “public charge,”  
 11 which required more than simply having “no visible means of support,” *City of*  
 12 *Boston v. Capen*, 61 Mass. 116, 121–22 (1851), but that persons be “unable to  
 13 take care of themselves,” *In re O’Sullivan*, 31 F. 447, 449 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.)  
 14 (quoting 22 Stat. 214); see, e.g., *Fischer v. Meader*, 111 A. 503, 504 (N.J. 1920)  
 15 (“abandoned child” in “legal effect . . . became a public charge, and a ward of the  
 16 state as *parens patriae*”); *Pine Twp. Overseers v. Franklin Twp. Overseers*, 4 Pa.  
 17 D. 715, 716, 1894 WL 3774, at \*2 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1894) (“both mother and  
 18 child, the present pauper, were public charges for maintenance and support”);  
 19 *Bunker v. Ficke*, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 978, 979, 1880 WL 5770 (Ohio Dist. 1880)  
 20 (“The obvious intention of the framers of the constitution being to regard insane  
 21  
 22

persons as the wards of the state, to be under the fostering and protecting charge of the state . . .").

## ii. The Immigration Act of 1882

Congress enacted the first federal public charge exclusion in 1882 to fill the void left from the Supreme Court’s invalidation of state passenger laws. *See Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York*, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875). Borrowing directly from state laws to impose a federal public charge ground of inadmissibility, the 1882 Congress described “public charge” to express its traditional, common law meaning—a person “unable to take care of himself or herself,” Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214—who primarily depends on the government for support. This understanding is reflected in the legislative history. *See* Complaint ¶ 62, *Make the Road New York, et al. v. Cuccinelli, et al.*, No. 19-cv-07993 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 27, 2019) (*Make the Road* Compl.), Bays Decl. Ex. DDD;<sup>12</sup> *In re Day*, 27 F. 678, 681 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). Indeed, the 1882 Act created a federal immigration head-tax which was used in part for the “relief” of immigrants in economic “distress”—i.e., those who were poor but not so destitute as to be considered public charges. 22 Stat. 214. Later bills

<sup>12</sup> The FAC and the *Make the Road* Complaint both contain fuller discussions of the legislative history of the relevant immigration statutes than space limitations permit here, including citations to the congressional record and congressional reports. Plaintiffs incorporate those citations by reference.

1 changed the wording of the clause to “likely to become a public charge,” and this  
 2 language has remained in the statute to the present. *Make the Road* Compl. ¶ 60  
 3 n.12.

4 **iii. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 and  
 5 subsequent enactments**

6 Congress overhauled federal immigration law in the Immigration and  
 7 Nationality Act of 1952 and reenacted the public charge exclusion. Pub. L.  
 8 82–414, 66 Stat. 163. The legislative history of the INA shows that Congress  
 9 intended to retain the common law meaning of “public charge.” *See* S. Rep. No.  
 10 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 349 (1950) (“The subcommittee recommends that  
 11 the clause excluding persons likely to become public charges should be retained  
 12 in the law.”).

13 In 1990, Congress amended the INA to remove the “paupers, professional  
 14 beggars, or vagrants” exclusions, but it retained the public charge inadmissibility  
 15 ground. *See* Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a)(4), 104 Stat.  
 16 4978, 5072 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).

17 **iv. Welfare Reform and Immigration Reform Acts**

18 Congress enacted two major immigration reform statutes in 1996. Neither  
 19 statute purported to redefine “public charge” or alter the traditional and  
 20 established understanding of the term.

21 First, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation  
 22 Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)

1 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-46), restricted certain noncitizens’  
 2 eligibility for most federal benefits.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, Congress allowed all  
 3 “qualified” immigrants—including lawful permanent residents—to receive after  
 4 five years of entry many forms of federal public benefits included in DHS’s Rule.  
 5 These include Medicaid, TANF, and SNAP. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(2)(L), 1613(a).  
 6 The “five-year ban” does not apply to certain benefits swept up in the Rule,  
 7 including Section 8 housing vouchers. *Id.* §§ 1612(a)(2)(A) & (a)(2)(C),  
 8 1613(b)(1)–(2).<sup>14</sup>

9 Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act  
 10 of 1996 (Immigration Reform Act)—enacted one month after the Welfare  
 11 Reform Act—reenacted the existing INA public charge provision and codified  
 12 the existing standard in case law for determining whether a noncitizen was

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13  
 14 <sup>13</sup> Prior to the Welfare Reform Act, lawfully present immigrants were  
 15 generally eligible for many public benefits on similar terms as U.S. citizens.  
 16 See H.R. Rpt. 104-725, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., July 30, 1996, at 379.

17 <sup>14</sup> States are authorized to determine the eligibility of qualified immigrants  
 18 for some federal programs (TANF, social services block grants, and Medicaid).  
 19 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1). Each state may determine the eligibility for any state  
 20 public benefits, and a state may statutorily provide that “an alien who is not  
 21 lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public  
 22 benefit.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d), 1622(a).

1 inadmissible as a public charge. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). It provided that a public  
2 charge determination should take account of the “totality of circumstances” and  
3 codified the five factors long applied by immigration officials: the applicant’s  
4 (1) age; (2) health; (3) family status; (4) assets, resources, and financial status;  
5 and (5) education and skills. Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, Sec.  
6 531(a)(4)(B) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B)(i)). Neither of  
7 those 1996 statutes altered the well-established meaning of “public charge” under  
8 the INA.

v. Congress repeatedly rejected the definition of “public charge” DHS now adopts

Congress’s decision to maintain the definition of “public charge” was no oversight. To the contrary, Congress repeatedly considered and rejected proposals to amend the INA public charge provisions to apply to persons who receive (or are considered likely to receive) the benefits DHS now deems off-limits. *See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987) (“Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend *sub silentio* to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In the debate leading up to enactment of the Immigration Reform Act, Congress considered and rejected a proposal to label anyone who received means-tested public benefits a public charge. Immigration Control and Financial

1 Responsibility Act of 1996, H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. § 202 (1996); Pub. L.  
 2 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009. The express purpose of this provision was to  
 3 overturn the settled understanding of “public charge” found in the case law.  
 4 *See Make the Road Compl.* ¶¶ 81–83.

5 In 2013, Congress repelled another effort to broaden the scope of the public  
 6 charge exclusion in a manner similar to DHS’s new definition. An amendment  
 7 proposed by then-Senator Jefferson B. Sessions to the Border Security, Economic  
 8 Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744, 113th Cong.  
 9 (2013), would have altered the definition of public charge to require applicants  
 10 to show “they were not likely to qualify even for non-cash employment supports  
 11 such as Medicaid . . . [and] SNAP.” S. Rep. No. 113-40, at 42 (2013). Once  
 12 again, the Senate rejected the amendment. *Id.*

13 By adopting virtually the same definition of “public charge” that Congress  
 14 rejected in 1996, the Rule contravenes the unambiguous meaning of the statute.

15 **d. The context of the public charge exclusion confirms that  
 16 Congress intended the term “public charge” to retain its  
 common law meaning**

17 In *Chevron* Step One, the court also “must place the provision in context,  
 18 interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.”  
 19 *Brown & Williamson*, 529 U.S. at 121 (internal quotation marks and citation  
 20 omitted). That “context” includes parallel statutory provisions, “other Acts,” *id.*,  
 21  
 22

1 and “the statutory backdrop of . . . agency directives,” *Nat'l Ass'n of Home*  
 2 *Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).

3 **i. Early judicial and agency interpretations**

4 During the first half of the 20th century, early judicial interpretations of  
 5 the original public charge provisions confirmed Congress’s intent to exclude only  
 6 those primarily dependent on the government for their care or management. *See*,  
 7 *e.g.*, *Howe v. United States ex rel. Savitsky*, 247 F. 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1917) (“[w]e  
 8 are convinced that Congress meant the act to exclude persons who were likely to  
 9 become occupants of almshouses for want of means with which to support  
 10 themselves in the future”); FAC ¶ 51 (collecting cases). Federal agencies charged  
 11 with enforcing those early federal immigration laws also read “public charge” to  
 12 mean a person incapable of self-support and dependent upon the state for  
 13 survival. *See* USCIS *Public Charge Hist. Backgr.* (“immigrants who showed they  
 14 had no physical or mental conditions that could prevent them from working and  
 15 who demonstrated a willingness to work were admitted”); FAC ¶ 53.

16 **ii. Modern agency interpretations**

17 Consistent with the original public meaning of “public charge,” federal  
 18 immigration authorities have applied the modern public charge provision only to  
 19 those dependent on government for survival. *See, e.g.*, *Matter of Martinez-Lopez*,  
 20 10 I. & N. Dec. 409, 421 (A.G. 1962) (then-Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy  
 21 detailing the public charge doctrine’s “extensive judicial interpretation” and  
 22

1 explaining that the INA “requires more than a showing of a possibility that the  
2 alien will require public support”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Final Rule: *Adjustment*  
3 *of Status for Certain Aliens*, 54 FR 29,442-01 (July 12, 1989) (codified in relevant  
4 part at 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(k)(4), 245a.3(g)(4)(iii), 245a.4(b)(1)(iv)(C)) (even  
5 where an immigrant’s “income may be below the poverty level,” he is “not  
6 excludable” if he “has a consistent employment history which shows the ability  
7 to support himself”); *Make the Road* Compl. ¶¶ 70–71. Congress’ reenactment  
8 of the INA’s public charge exclusion “against the backdrop of” these “consistent  
9 and repeated statements” by immigration enforcement agencies precludes DHS’s  
10 novel definition in the Rule. *Brown & Williamson*, 529 U.S. at 144.

iii. Post-1996 Agency Field Guidance confirms the settled interpretation of “public charge”

In 1999 Field Guidance, INS confirmed that the Welfare Reform and Immigration Reform Acts did not change the “longstanding” law governing public charge inadmissibility.<sup>15</sup> To the contrary, the meaning of “public charge”

17       <sup>15</sup> Following the Welfare Reform Act, public confusion emerged about the  
18       relationship between receipt of federal, state, or local benefits and the public  
19       charge provisions of federal immigration law. *Field Guidance on Deportability*  
20       and *Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds*, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689-01,  
21       28,689 (May 26, 1999) (Field Guidance). According to the U.S. Department of  
22       State, “such confusion led many persons in the immigrant community to choose

1 “has been developed in several [INS], BIA, and Attorney General decisions” and  
 2 codified in INA “section 212(a)(4) itself” in its “‘totality of circumstances’ test.”  
 3 Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,  
 4 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689; 28,690 (May 26, 1999).

5 Consistent with the common law definition, INS confirmed that “likely to  
 6 become a public charge” means “likely to become . . . primarily dependent on the  
 7 Government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash  
 8 assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at  
 9 Government expense.” *Id.* at 28,692. The Field Guidance expressly excluded  
 10 from the public charge determination noncash benefits such as Medicaid (for  
 11 those not institutionalized), nutrition programs like SNAP, and housing benefits.  
 12 INS noted that it had “never been [INS] policy that any receipt of services or  
 13 benefits paid for in whole or in part from public funds . . . indicates that the alien  
 14 is likely to become a public charge.” *Id.* The Field Guidance governed the  
 15 agencies responsible for public charge inadmissibility determinations, including

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16  
 17 not to sign up for important benefits, especially health-related benefits, which  
 18 they were eligible to receive” out of “concern[s] it would affect their or a family  
 19 member’s immigration status.” U.S. State Department Cable, INA 212(A)(4)  
 20 Public Charge: Policy Guidance, Ref: 9 FAM 40.41 (State Department cable).  
 21 INS issued the Field Guidance for public charge determinations to eliminate the  
 22 confusion. 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689-01.

1 DHS, for more than two decades. *See, e.g.*, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Public Charge  
 2 Fact Sheet, 2009 WL 3453730 (Oct. 29, 2011); Public Charge Fact Sheet, USCIS,  
 3 Apr. 29, 2011.

4 **2. The Rule adopts an interpretation expressly rejected by  
 5 Congress**

6 The Rule also is contrary to law because it adopts a statutory interpretation  
 7 explicitly disavowed by Congress. Here, Congress has repeatedly rejected the  
 8 “transformative” immigration policy the Administration now purports to  
 9 establish.<sup>16</sup> *See supra* at 29–30.

10 The Ninth Circuit has already admonished this administration for seeking  
 11 to “coopt Congress’s power to legislate” through executive actions. *City &*  
 12 *County of San Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1234 (Rejecting Executive Order regarding  
 13 sanctuary cities, reasoning “Congress has frequently considered and thus far  
 14 rejected legislation accomplishing the goals of the Executive Order . . . . Not only  
 15 has the Administration claimed for itself Congress’s exclusive spending power,  
 16 it has also attempted to coopt Congress’s power to legislate.”); *see also Brown &*  
 17 *Williamson*, 529 U.S. at 147 (holding FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco  
 18 products as customarily marketed and noting that “before enacting the FCLAA  
 19 in 1965, Congress considered and rejected several proposals to give the FDA the

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20  
 21 <sup>16</sup> Sullivan & Shear, *Trump Sees an Obstacle to Getting His Way on*  
 22 *Immigration: His Own Officials*, *supra* note 4.

1 authority to regulate tobacco”); *Pennsylvania v. Trump*, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 821  
 2 (E.D. Pa. 2019), *aff’d sub nom. Pennsylvania v. President United States*, 930 F.3d  
 3 543 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (July 18, 2019) (rejecting agency interpretation  
 4 because, in part, “Congress [previously] explicitly rejected an attempt to add to  
 5 the ACA an exemption similar to that contained in the Final Rules”).

6 As Judge Srinivasan on the DC Circuit observed, “[a]n activist President  
 7 with control over the rulemaking process could use his power to press agencies  
 8 beyond statutory limits that he was unable to persuade Congress to remove. Such  
 9 a President would be guilty of unfaithful execution of the laws.” *United States*  
 10 *Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n*, 855 F.3d 381, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2017)  
 11 (quoting Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency  
 12 Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 455 (1987)).

13 **3. The Rule’s weighted criteria are contrary to law**

14 DHS’s new definition of “public charge,” based on its unwarranted focus  
 15 on poverty, distorts the “totality of circumstances” test. This fundamental error  
 16 compels invalidation of the rule. *See, e.g., Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. v. U.S.*  
 17 *EPA*, 108 F.3d 1454, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam); *North Carolina v. EPA*,  
 18 531 F.3d 896, 929, *on reh’g in part*, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

19 **a. The weighted criteria are contrary to the INA and**  
 20 **Immigration Reform Act**

21 The Rule’s new public charge test transforms the “totality of  
 22 circumstances” inquiry mandated by Congress into a categorical test of DHS’s

1 own making. Because the four “heavily weighted negative factors” overlap with  
 2 other enumerated “negative” factors, any one heavily weighted negative factor  
 3 may trigger a public charge finding under the new Rule. The new test as written  
 4 treats one main consideration—poverty—as paramount, if not dispositive,  
 5 elevating it above the required statutory factors set forth in the INA itself.

6 The heavily weighted factor of whether an immigrant “has received or has  
 7 been certified or approved to receive one or more public benefits” above the  
 8 12-month threshold is duplicative of several other negative factors: an immigrant  
 9 who met or exceeded the public benefits threshold will *ipso facto* have “applied  
 10 for or received any public benefit” in any amount and be virtually certain to have  
 11 a “gross income [of] less than 125 percent” of the FPG (both of which are  
 12 nominally separate negative, but not heavily weighted, factors). 8 C.F.R.  
 13 § 212.22(b)(4)(i)(A), (b)(4)(ii)(E)(1). The past receipt of public benefits above  
 14 the 12-month threshold appears dispositive, contrary to the INA’s mandated  
 15 totality of circumstances inquiry. *See, e.g., Martinez-Farias v. Holder*, 338 F.  
 16 App’x 729, 730–31 (9th Cir. 2009) (in making public charge determination, INA  
 17 Section 212(a)(4)(B) requires decision maker to consider all statutory factors).

18 The Rule likewise makes an immigrant’s medical condition virtually  
 19 dispositive. A medical condition counts as a heavily weighted negative factor if  
 20 the following two conditions apply: (1) the immigrant ‘has been diagnosed with  
 21 a medical condition that is likely to require extensive medical treatment or

1 institutionalization or that will interfere with [his or her] ability to provide for  
 2 himself or herself, attend school, or work;” and (2) the immigrant “is uninsured  
 3 and has neither the prospect of obtaining private health insurance, nor the  
 4 financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs related to such  
 5 medical condition.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c)(1)(iii). This heavily weighted factor is  
 6 duplicative of other, ostensibly separate, negative factors. *See, e.g.*, 8 C.F.R.  
 7 § 212.22(b)(2)(ii)(B) (treating as negative factor if immigrant “has been  
 8 diagnosed with a medical condition that is likely to require extensive medical  
 9 treatment or institutionalization or that will interfere with [his or her] ability to  
 10 provide and care for himself or herself, to attend school, or to work”). Because  
 11 the medical condition factor is likely to be dispositive under the Rule’s weighted  
 12 test, it is contrary to the totality of circumstances inquiry mandated by the INA.

13 The overlapping medical condition factors are contrary to the INA for  
 14 another reason: they go well beyond the discrete “health-related grounds” that  
 15 Congress has expressly set forth as basis of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C.  
 16 § 1182(a)(1)(A). Under INA Section 212(a)(1), a noncitizen is inadmissible for  
 17 health-related reasons only if he or she (1) has a “communicable disease of public  
 18 health significance”; (2) failed to submit proof of vaccinations; (3) has or had a  
 19 “physical or mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the  
 20 disorder” posing a present “threat to the property, safety, or welfare” of the  
 21 immigrant or others; or (4) has been determined to be a “drug abuser or addict.”

1      *Id.* The provision of those limited health-based grounds of inadmissibility  
 2      strongly suggests that Congress did not intend for the Department to create much  
 3      broader health-based exclusions under the guise of a public charge regulation.  
 4      *See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (maxim of  
 5      *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*).

6      The statutory history makes that intent even clearer. The 1952 INA's  
 7      health-related exclusions were much broader, rendering inadmissible anyone  
 8      who was "insane," "epilep[tic]," or who had "a physical defect disease, or  
 9      disability, when determined by the consular or immigration officer to be of such  
 10     a nature that it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living." 66 Stat. 163,  
 11     182, § 212(a). Congress eliminated those grounds of exclusion in the  
 12     Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4978, § 601. Yet the Department has now  
 13     engrafted that broad health exclusion onto its new public charge test, despite  
 14     Congress having stripped it from the INA decades ago. In this respect, the Rule  
 15     is contrary to the text of the statute and the clearly expressed intent of Congress.  
 16     *See, e.g., Cal. Cosmetology Coal. v. Riley*, 110 F.3d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1997)  
 17     ("A regulation may not serve to amend a statute, nor add to the statute 'something  
 18     which is not there.'") (citation omitted) (quoting *United States v. Calamaro*, 354  
 19     U.S. 351, 359 (1957)).

20  
 21  
 22

b. The weighted criteria are contrary to the Welfare Reform Act

The Rule's focus on immigrants' use of non-cash public benefits to deprive them of the ability to remain in the United States also is inconsistent with the Welfare Reform Act, which expressly allowed qualified immigrants to receive after five years of entry many forms of federal public benefits included in the Rule. *See supra* at 27–29. *Iwata v. Intel Corp.*, 349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 147 (D. Mass. 2004) (rejecting interpretation of statute that would allow for a “bait-and-switch” where a person would be covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act up until the point she needs the act and reasoning that statute “must be interpreted to give effect to the rights [it] has created”); *see also Rotenberry v. Comm'r Internal Rev.*, 847 F.2d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Congress did not intend that the Secretary set a trap for the unwary.”).

c. The weighted criteria are contrary to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

The Rule also is contrary to the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits “any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” or “any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency,” from excluding, denying benefits to, or discriminating against persons with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Rule violates this provision by requiring officials to consider an applicant’s “medical condition”—including a “disability diagnosis”—to weigh in favor of a public charge determination. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c)(1)(iii)(A); 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,407–08. Such facially discriminatory treatment will be exacerbated by the

1 consideration of other negative factors related to a disability, such as receipt of  
 2 Medicaid home and community-based services. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.21(b)(5),  
 3 212.22(b)(4)(E); 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,367–68; *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i).<sup>17</sup>  
 4 Because the Rule’s overlapping criteria operate in such a way that an applicant’s  
 5 disability will often be the “but for” cause of a public charge determination, it  
 6 violates Section 504. *See, e.g., D.F. ex rel. L.M.P. v. Leon Cty. Sch. Bd.*,  
 7 No. 4:13CV3-RH/CAS, 2014 WL 28798, at \*2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2014) (under  
 8 Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff’s disability must be a “but for” cause of the denial of  
 9 services, but the disability need not be the “sole” cause); *Franco-Gonzalez v.*  
 10 *Holder*, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, at \*4 (C.D. Cal.  
 11 Apr. 23, 2013); *Lovell v. Chandler*, 303 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002).

12 **4. The Rule is arbitrary or capricious**

13 A regulation is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “relied on factors  
 14 which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an  
 15 important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

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17 <sup>17</sup> Moreover, receiving Medicaid services will disqualify many disabled  
 18 applicants from two independent *positive* public charge factors: private health  
 19 insurance and sufficient household assets to cover reasonably foreseeable  
 20 medical costs. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c)(2)(iii); 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,299 (explaining  
 21 the first “heavily weighted positive factor” is “in addition to the [second] positive  
 22 factor”).

1 counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not  
 2 be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”  
 3 *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm)*,  
 4 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). When an agency departs from a well-established prior  
 5 policy that “engendered serious reliance interests”—as DHS has done here—the  
 6 agency must provide a more “detailed justification” for its actions. *FCC v. Fox*  
 7 *Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). DHS has failed to do so.

8 DHS received over 265,000 comments—the “vast majority” of which  
 9 opposed the Rule and provided compelling evidence of devastating harms likely  
 10 to result from its implementation. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,304; *see, e.g.*, Bays Decl.  
 11 Exs. H–CCC (examples of comments submitted in opposition to the Rule). DHS  
 12 largely ignored these concerns and instead chose to finalize—without sufficiently  
 13 reasoned justification—a Rule that all but promises to inflict the very harms  
 14 warned of by commenters. Where DHS did address concerns, it largely brushed  
 15 them aside, stating in conclusory fashion that it did not intend to cause the harms  
 16 at issue or the purported goal of the Rule merited the trade-off. The Rule is  
 17 arbitrary and capricious for two primary reasons: (1) DHS failed to address,  
 18 justify, or even meaningfully evaluate the many significant harms identified by  
 19 commenters; and (2) the Rule promotes the consideration of factors entirely  
 20 unrelated to—and at times directly at odds with—its purported purpose.

1                   a. **DHS failed to justify or meaningfully address the Rule's**  
 2                   **many devastating harms**

3                   DHS has failed to address drastic harms the Rule will cause, including to  
 4                   public health generally and to vulnerable populations specifically, such as  
 5                   children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities.

6                   i. **DHS disregarded evidence the Rule will cause**  
 7                   **public health crises**

8                   DHS received compelling evidence and comments warning the Rule was  
 9                   likely to cause significant public health crises. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl. Exs. R  
 10                  at 31–32; T at 107–09. By deterring participation in Medicaid, the Rule would  
 11                  result in decreased vaccinations and a corresponding increase in the transmission  
 12                  of communicable diseases. 84 Fed Reg. at 41,384 (noting comments stating that  
 13                  “uninsured individuals are much less likely to be vaccinated,” and that “even a  
 14                  five percent reduction in vaccine coverage could trigger a significant measles  
 15                  outbreak”); Bays Decl. Exs. J at 2–3 (“Discouraged access to preventive services  
 16                  would inevitably have a devastating impact on immunization coverage for  
 17                  immigrant populations.”); FF at 3 (“[D]ecreased vaccinations and untreated  
 18                  communicable diseases will place the American public at risk for outbreaks.”).

19                  DHS also received comments identifying a host of other public health  
 20                  crises likely to result from the Rule, including malnutrition, unintended  
 21                  pregnancies, substance abuse, obesity, homelessness, untreated chronic illnesses,  
 22                  and mental health disorders. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl. Exs. O at 1–2, AA at 2, EE at  
 23                  2–3, GG at 1, HH at 1, II at 2, NN at 3 (warning of harm to individuals suffering

1 from chronic medical conditions and diseases such as Hepatitis B, HIV,  
 2 tuberculosis, and blood cancers such as lymphoma and leukemia); Exs. OO at 7,  
 3 QQ at 2 (warning of reduced early detection and treatment of sexually transmitted  
 4 diseases); Ex. M at 6 (warning of reduced access to family planning resources).

5 DHS acknowledged the Rule may lead to these public health crises.  
 6 *See, e.g.*, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,270 (“[D]isenrollment or forgoing enrollment in  
 7 public benefits program by [otherwise eligible] aliens” may result in, among  
 8 other things, increased obesity, malnutrition, and transmission of communicable  
 9 diseases). Nevertheless, DHS still has not conducted any adequate analysis to  
 10 measure the public health effects on the American public. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl.  
 11 Ex. J at 2 (“[W]e are concerned that [DHS] failed to quantify the human and  
 12 economic impact from [either] the increased prevalence of communicable  
 13 diseases [or] the fact that the prevalence could be exacerbated by fewer  
 14 vaccinated individuals.”). DHS instead responded that it would exempt from  
 15 consideration receipt of Medicaid benefits only for pregnant women and  
 16 individuals under 21 years of age. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,384 (asserting, without  
 17 evidentiary support, that these exemptions “should address a substantial portion,  
 18 though not all, of the vaccinations issue”).

19 DHS’s cursory response disregards overwhelming evidence that even a  
 20 slight decrease in population immunity may give rise to a dangerous outbreak of  
 21 communicable diseases. Bays Decl. Exs. J at 2–3, T at 107–09. And, DHS’s  
 22

1 response—if any—to the other likely public health crises is even more  
2 problematic. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,384 (arguing without analysis that, in lieu of  
3 Medicaid, unidentified “local health centers and state health departments may  
4 provide certain health services addressing substance abuse and mental  
5 disorders”). DHS’s failure to appropriately analyze or respond to overwhelming  
6 evidence of potentially devastating public health crises underscores that the Rule  
7 is arbitrary and capricious.

ii. **DHS disregarded evidence of the Rule's harmful effects on children**

DHS received numerous comments and compelling evidence showing the Rule would inflict dramatic and lasting harms on vulnerable children. Commenters explained that the Rule will cause at-risk children to suffer increased hunger, malnutrition, and homelessness. Commenters also provided evidence showing the trauma resulting from childhood food insecurity and housing instability is likely to have lifelong effects, severely compromising these children’s physical and mental health, educational outcomes, and employment prospects. Bays Decl. Exs. S at 32–35; VV at 12–13. The lasting trauma of such childhood instability results in a broad variety of negative outcomes, including chronic asthma, higher incidences of unplanned pregnancies, substance abuse, depression, and behavioral challenges. *Id.*; Bays Decl. Exs. T at 61–62; V at 4.

While detailing the harms the Rule will inflict upon vulnerable children, commenters also questioned what reasonable basis DHS had for applying such a

1 rigid public charge analysis to children in the first place, as they are too young to  
2 work and their use of public benefits is not probative of their likelihood of  
3 becoming a public charge when older. Bays Decl. Ex. T at 74-78. DHS itself  
4 agrees the programs at issue are intended to *help* children become healthy, safe,  
5 and successful in their educations, thus improving their employment prospects  
6 and moving them toward the Rule’s purported goal of self-sufficiency. 84 Fed.  
7 Reg. at 41,370–71 (acknowledging “many of the public benefits programs [at  
8 issue] aim to better future economic and health outcomes for minor recipients”).

9           In response, DHS merely amended the Proposed Rule to exclude from  
10 consideration only the receipt of Medicaid benefits by individuals under 21. DHS  
11 will still, however, consider a young child’s receipt of SNAP or federal housing  
12 assistance as evidence the child is likely to become a public charge. DHS’s failure  
13 to address the overwhelming evidence showing children will suffer severe harms  
14 from the Rule’s implementation (directly undermining their chances of reaching  
15 DHS’s purported goal of “self-sufficiency”) is arbitrary and capricious,  
16 underscoring the Plaintiff States’ likelihood of success on the merits.

iii. DHS disregarded the Rule's harmful and discriminatory effects on the elderly and individuals with disabilities

19 DHS received many comments detailing the discriminatory and harmful  
20 effects the Rule will have on the elderly and individuals with disabilities. *See,*  
21 *e.g.*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,367. For example, commenters noted that counting an

1 individual's disability as a negative health factor was discriminatory and would  
 2 overlap with other factors. Bays Decl. Ex. X at 6 ("[T]he proposed formula  
 3 effectively authorizes blanket determinations that anyone with a significant  
 4 disability is likely to become a public charge."). Further, many of the services on  
 5 which people with disabilities rely are available only through Medicaid, meaning  
 6 the Rule will separate these already-vulnerable individuals from the very services  
 7 that assist them in reaching DHS's purported goal of "self-sufficiency." Bays  
 8 Decl. Exs. JJ at 6; L at 9–10 ("Individuals with significant disabilities, including  
 9 even highly educated professionals and business owners, typically must retain  
 10 Medicaid coverage because no other public or private program covers the  
 11 attendant care and equipment they need to get up, get dressed, and go to work.").

12 Similarly, the Rule focuses almost exclusively on the age and economic  
 13 value of elderly applicants, ignoring the many other contributions they make to  
 14 family stability, including caring for children and enabling other family members  
 15 to work. Bays Decl. Ex. S at 80. Preventing these elderly applicants from  
 16 accessing benefits they have paid for with their taxes would *reduce* their  
 17 self-sufficiency, severely endanger their health, and make it more difficult for  
 18 them to live with and contribute to their families. Bays Decl. Ex. KK at 7–9.

19 DHS readily conceded the potentially "outsized impact" the Rule might  
 20 have on specific vulnerable populations, including individuals with disabilities.  
 21 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,368. DHS largely dismissed such concerns, however, noting  
 22

simply that age and health are statutory factors and “it is not the intent, nor is it the effect of this rule to find a person a public charge *solely* based on his disability.” *Id.* (emphasis added). But, as commenters noted, DHS’s selection of arbitrary, poorly defined, and overlapping factors will not only inflict severe harm on these already vulnerable populations but will also give immigration officials unfettered discretion to deem them public charges. Bays Decl. Exs. L at 12–14; X at 6. DHS’s disregard for the evidence it received, as well as its refusal to meaningfully address the discriminatory and lasting harms on these populations, underscores the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Rule.

**b. DHS ignored evidence showing the factors in the public charge analysis are arbitrary and capricious**

DHS’s multifactor test is itself arbitrary and capricious. As set forth below, DHS relies on vague, poorly defined factors that are inconsistent with—and often directly at odds with—the Rule’s purported purpose, further demonstrating the lack of any “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43; Bays Decl. Ex. R at 40. Below are a few such examples.

**i. Income thresholds**

The Rule imposes arbitrary income thresholds for making public charge determinations, despite DHS’s own evidence that such thresholds are unrelated to the Rule’s stated purpose. Under the Rule, an income “below [the] level of 125 percent of FPG would generally be a heavily weighed negative factor,” 84 Fed.

1       Reg. at 41,332, while a household income higher than 250% of the FPG (\$64,375  
 2       annually for a family of four) would be “heavily positive.” 84 Fed. Reg. at  
 3       41,502-04; 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c). Many commenters, however, noted the arbitrary  
 4       and capricious nature of these thresholds, as well as the devastating effects they  
 5       will have on hardworking, law-abiding immigrants. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl. Ex. R  
 6       at 47–48 (warning that under the arbitrary income thresholds, “nearly 200,000  
 7       married couples in the United States would be faced with a wrenching choice:  
 8       leave the United States, or live apart”).

9           DHS’s reliance on these income thresholds is irrational based also on  
 10       DHS’s own evidence and data. In the Proposed Rule’s preamble, DHS defended  
 11       the income thresholds on the ground “[t]he percentage of people receiving these  
 12       public benefits generally goes down as the income percentage increases.” 83 Fed.  
 13       Reg. at 51,204. This assertion rings hollow, though, as eligibility for public  
 14       benefits is generally means-tested based on an applicant’s income. DHS’s data  
 15       shows that even immigrants in the lowest-income group analyzed—those with  
 16       incomes below 125% of FPG—were in general *unlikely* to receive such public  
 17       benefits. 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,204 tbl. 28. Medicaid, the most-utilized public benefit  
 18       received by the group, had a participation rate of 39.2%. Further, such rigid  
 19       income thresholds may lead to the perverse result that an applicant who works  
 20       full-time making minimum wage but has never used *any* of the benefits at issue  
 21       would be assigned a negative factor and branded a public charge. In  
 22

1 “contradict[ing] the evidence before” DHS, the Rule is “internally inconsistent,”  
 2 “arbitrary and capricious.” *Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA*, 788 F.3d  
 3 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015).

4 **ii. English proficiency**

5 DHS treats as a negative factor an immigrant’s “lack of English  
 6 proficiency.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,435. DHS cites no evidence suggesting that  
 7 immigrants “lacking English proficiency”—a vague and poorly defined factor—  
 8 are “more likely than not at any time in the future” to receive the public benefits  
 9 at issue. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,501. Instead, DHS starts from its conclusion and  
 10 works backward, asserting that in a USCIS survey of noncitizens, the rate of  
 11 enrollment in non-cash benefits programs was lower among “those who spoke  
 12 English either well or very well (about 15 to 20 percent)” compared to “those  
 13 who either spoke English poorly or not at all (about 25 to 30 percent).” 84 Fed.  
 14 Reg. at 41,448. As numerous commenters noted, DHS’s reliance on such an  
 15 arbitrary, undefined factor not only affords undue discretion to immigration  
 16 officials but also ignores a wealth of evidence demonstrating that an immigrant’s  
 17 language proficiency is not an immutable characteristic making them likely to  
 18 become a public charge. *See, e.g.*, Bays Decl. Ex. XX at 6–7 (“Although  
 19 non-citizens who are limited English proficient may face initial challenges in  
 20 obtaining certain jobs, their ability to speak another language may serve them  
 21  
 22

1 well economically in the long run.”); see *Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S.*  
2 *Fish & Wildlife*, 273 F.3d 1229, 1251 (9th Cir. 2001) (agency action was  
3 “arbitrary and capricious” based on “lack of an articulated, rational connection”  
4 between regulatory condition and purpose as well as the “the vagueness of the  
5 condition itself”). And, DHS’s own data once again undermines its conclusion,  
6 as its survey shows immigrants with limited English proficiency were more likely  
7 *not* to utilize public benefits. 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,195 tbl. 24.

### iii. Credit scores

9 The Rule considers credit reports and credit scores in the public charge  
10 analysis. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,425. DHS's reliance on such evidence is not justified,  
11 as there is no evidence credit scores or reports have any relevance in determining  
12 whether someone is likely to become a public charge. Bays Decl. Exs. Y at 1–3;  
13 Z at 1–3; TT at 1–4; ZZ at 1–3. Consideration of credit reports in this context is  
14 arbitrary, as (1) immigrants are likely to have no or thin credit histories and  
15 artificially low credit scores; (2) credit reports are not generally available in  
16 languages other than English, which could limit immigrants with language  
17 barriers from correcting errors (thus double-counting English proficiency in the  
18 public charge analysis); and (3) a bad credit score is frequently the result of a  
19 temporary circumstance such as illness or job loss and does not reflect whether  
20 someone is likely to become a public charge. Further, credit reports suffer from  
21 unacceptable rates of inaccuracy, with at least 21% of consumers having verified

1 errors on their reports. Bays Decl. Exs. Y at 1–3; Z at 2. DHS offers no rationale  
 2 for introducing such dramatically high error rates into the public charge analysis,  
 3 and although it promises not to consider “verified errors,” the process for  
 4 consumers to address such errors is extremely burdensome—especially for  
 5 immigrants—and private credit reporting agencies may still fail to correct them.

6 \* \* \*

7 For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff States are likely to prevail on the  
 8 merits of their claims that the Rule violates the APA because it is contrary to law  
 9 and arbitrary or capricious.

10 **C. Absent a Stay or Injunctive Relief, the Plaintiff States Will Suffer  
 11 Immediate and Irreparable Harm**

12 Were the Final Rule to take effect, the Plaintiff States are “likely to suffer  
 13 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20.  
 14 Because the Final Rule will cause mass disenrollment and forbearance from  
 15 enrollment by immigrants from federal and state benefits programs, it will result  
 16 in worsened health, nutrition, and housing outcomes for those individuals. This  
 17 vitiates the purposes of state programs, results in deterioration in health and  
 18 well-being for state residents, and exponentially increases the financial burden  
 19 on the States.

20 **1. Categories of irreparable harm to be considered by the Court**

21 The Rule triggers three forms of irreparable harms. First, “ongoing harms  
 22 to [the Plaintiff States’] organizational missions.” *Valle Del Sol v. Whiting*,

1      723 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013); *League of Women Voters of United States*  
 2      *v. Newby*, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016); *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant*,  
 3      354 F. Supp. 3d at 1109. Second, negative “consequences for public health” and  
 4      well-being. *State v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074 (N.D.  
 5      Cal. 2018); *see also California v. Health & Human Servs.*, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806,  
 6      830 (N.D. Cal. 2017), *aff’d in pertinent part sub nom. California v. Azar*,  
 7      911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held repeatedly that  
 8      loss of public health benefits constitutes irreparable injury. *See M.R. v. Dreyfus*,  
 9      697 F.3d 706, 732–33 (9th Cir. 2012); *Beltran v. Myers*, 677 F.2d 1317, 1322  
 10     (9th Cir. 1982). Third, uncompensable economic harm—which may include  
 11     “budget uncertainty” experienced by government organizations that cannot  
 12     “budget, plan for the future, and properly serve their residents,” *County of Santa*  
 13     *Clara v. Trump*, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2017). *California v. Azar*,  
 14     911 F.3d at 581; *Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe*, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir.  
 15     2015); *California v. Health and Human Servs.*, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1298 (N.D.  
 16     Cal. 2019).

17     **2. Disenrollment from federal and state programs will result in  
 18     irreparable harm to health care, nutrition, and housing**

19     The direct disenrollment from the listed federal programs, and anticipated  
 20     chilling effects to enrollment in state benefit programs, will result in irreparable  
 21     harms to state residents, the mission of state programs, and ultimately to state  
 22     treasuries. Proposed Rule, *Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds*, 83 Fed.

1       Reg. at 51,114, 51,266–69 (Oct. 18, 2019); 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,312 (conceding  
 2       that the Rule will result in significant disenrollment by immigrants); *see supra* at  
 3       10–12.

4               The initial, and potentially most significant, area affected by  
 5       disenrollments as a result of the Rule is health care. Medicaid is a vital source of  
 6       preventative care, lessens financial hardship, helps women have healthy  
 7       pregnancies, and reduces preventable mortality. *See supra* at 12–13. Even under  
 8       DHS’s estimate, were 2.5% of immigrants to choose to forgo health care to  
 9       protect their immigration status, the results would be immediate, predictable and  
 10       irreversible. *See supra* at 11. Put simply, “[p]eople will die. The anxiety and fear  
 11       generated in the immigrant population will lead to people not seeking care for  
 12       emergent conditions (heart attacks, for example).” Oliver Decl. ¶ 21.

13               Beyond the individual effect, a lack of health care harms entire families  
 14       because those who disenroll may be deterred from seeking coverage for their  
 15       dependent children, no matter the minor’s immigration status. *See supra*  
 16       at 13–14. Furthermore, this disenrollment will have community-wide effects,  
 17       including the prevalence of disease “among members of the U.S. citizen  
 18       population who are not vaccinated.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,270; 84 Fed. Reg.  
 19       at 41,384; *see supra* at 13–14. Finally, forgone health care coverage and  
 20       preventative care, as DHS admits, will cause higher and more frequent  
 21       emergency services and uncompensated care costs, as immigrants without  
 22

1     healthcare turn to the emergency room for care. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,384; *see supra*  
 2     at 14. These increased costs “shall now fall solely on the [States’] taxpayers,”  
 3     harming the Plaintiff States’ financial health. Pryor Decl. ¶ 10.

4             Second, the Final Rule will also create food insecurity, resulting in  
 5     increased costs to the Plaintiff States and the frustration of programs which aim  
 6     to create a well-nourished, productive population. SNAP, and corresponding  
 7     state programs, will likely suffer reduction in enrollees. *See supra* at 14–15.  
 8     When immigrants make the heartbreakng decision to forgo food assistance to  
 9     maintain immigration status, the effects are threefold. First, and most  
 10    immediately, more families, including those with U.S. citizen children become  
 11    hungry. *See supra* at 15–16. Second, disenrollment results in losses to economic  
 12    activity and productive output, thus harming the Plaintiff States’ economies. *See*  
 13    *supra* at 15–16. The State of Illinois, alone, estimates a loss to its economy of  
 14    \$95 to \$222 million in economic stimulus because of immigrant withdrawals  
 15    from SNAP. Hou Decl. ¶ 23. Finally, hungry children use more state resources—  
 16    educational, social services, and health care. *See supra* at 15–16.

17             Third, immigrant disenrollment in federal and state housing assistance  
 18    programs will lead to increased homelessness and a cascade of negative  
 19    outcomes, both for the affected individuals and the States. Especially in markets  
 20    where immigrants are more often employed in lower-paying jobs, housing,  
 21    without assistance, will quickly become unsustainable and more people will

1       become homeless, thereby increasing the demand on state sheltering resources  
 2       and finances. *See supra* at 16–18. Increased homelessness has immediate and  
 3       irreparable consequences for public health and has proven to have deleterious  
 4       effects on children’s lifetime outcomes. *See supra* at 16–17. Indeed, “[t]he  
 5       longterm social costs of poor health and education far outweigh the cost of  
 6       providing rental assistance.” Carey Decl. ¶ 13.

7           Overall, the Final Rule will lead to a state population which is sicker,  
 8       hungrier, and less able to contribute to the economic vitality of their communities,  
 9       all of which imposes significant costs for the Plaintiff States.

10       **D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Both Favor a Preliminary  
 11       Injunction**

12       When the government is a party, the final two *Winter* factors merge.  
 13       *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). “[T]he  
 14       purpose of such interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights  
 15       of the parties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.”  
 16       *Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project*, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). The  
 17       principal consideration concerns the extent of the “public consequences”  
 18       attendant to the stay of the Rule. *Ramirez v. United States Immigration and  
 19       Customs Enf’t*, 310 F. Supp. 3d 7, 32 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting *Winter*, 555 U.S. at  
 20       24); *see also Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996. Here, the balance of the equities and  
 21       public interest strongly favor a stay.

1        “There is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful  
 2 agency action. To the contrary, there is a substantial public interest in having  
 3 governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and  
 4 operations.” *League of Women Voters*, 838 F.3d at 12 (citations and internal  
 5 quotation marks omitted). The Rule violates the APA, and will have significant,  
 6 and immediate, consequences across the country (including the Plaintiff States  
 7 and their residents). It is, without doubt, in the public interest to prevent lawfully-  
 8 present individuals and families with children from abandoning myriad federal  
 9 and state health, education, and housing benefits to which they are entitled by  
 10 law because of fear of future repercussions to their immigration status.

11        By contrast, preserving the status quo will not harm the defendants, and  
 12 refraining from enforcing the Final Rule will cost them nothing. *See Diaz v.*  
 13 *Brewer*, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011) (court may waive Rule 65(c) bond  
 14 requirement). Indeed, the Plaintiff States merely seek to keep in place regulations  
 15 which have governed for the past 23 years. *See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.*  
 16 *Trump*, 932 F.3d 742, 778 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying the government’s motions to  
 17 stay district court’s TRO, reasoning, in part, that the TRO merely “restored the  
 18 law to what it had been for many years prior”).

19        Thus, the final two *Winter* factors weigh heavily in favor of the interim  
 20 equitable relief sought by the Plaintiff States.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the all the reasons above, the Plaintiff States respectfully request that the Court stay the Rule pending a final adjudication of their claims on the merits or, in the alternative, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing or implementing the Rule.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of September, 2019.

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