

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
TYLER DIVISION**

TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION and  
DR. ADAM CORLEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,  
and the CURRENT HEADS OF THOSE  
AGENCIES IN THEIR OFFICIAL  
CAPACITIES,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00425-JDK

**BRIEF OF THE LEUKEMIA & LYMPHOMA SOCIETY AND  
11 OTHER PATIENT AND CONSUMER ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS  
AS *AMICI CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS**

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## INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*<sup>1</sup>

*Amici curiae* The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, The ALS Association, Cancer Support Community, Community Catalyst, Crohn's & Colitis Foundation, Epilepsy Foundation, Every Texan, Families USA Action, Hemophilia Federation of America, The Mended Hearts, Inc., National Multiple Sclerosis Society, and National Patient Advocate Foundation (collectively, "*Amici*") are patient and consumer advocacy organizations that represent or work on behalf of millions of patients and consumers across the country, including those facing serious, acute, and chronic health conditions.<sup>2</sup> *Amici* are committed to ensuring that all Americans have a high-quality health care system and access to comprehensive, affordable health insurance to prevent disease, manage health, cure illness, and ensure financial stability.

Many patients served by *Amici* are among the one in six Americans who have received a surprise medical bill.<sup>3</sup> Given the impact of surprise bills on those we serve, many of our organizations joined community principles for surprise billing reforms<sup>4</sup> and worked with Congress to develop the bipartisan, bicameral No Surprises Act of the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (the "No Surprises Act" or the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020). With these community principles as our guide, many *Amici* were heavily engaged

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<sup>1</sup> All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No person other than *amici curiae* made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

<sup>2</sup> Descriptions of *Amici* are attached as the Appendix to this brief.

<sup>3</sup> See Lunna Lopes *et al.*, Kaiser Family Found., *Data Note: Public Worries About And Experience With Surprise Medical Bills* (Feb. 28, 2020), <https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/data-note-public-worries-about-and-experience-with-surprise-medical-bills/>.

<sup>4</sup> See ALS Ass'n *et al.*, *Surprise Medical Billing Principles*, <https://cqrcengage.com/mda/file/MR7G24UyMDP/022420%20SMB%20Coalition%20Principles%20-%20FINAL.pdf>.

throughout the legislative process leading to the Act’s passage and Defendants’ rulemaking.

Because the patients and consumers we serve have a strong interest in the outcome of this litigation, *Amici* respectfully submit this brief in support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion (“Defs.’ Cross-Motion”) [ECF No. 62].

### **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

Effective implementation of the No Surprises Act is necessary to reduce the financial burden of illness on patients and help contribute to longer, healthier lives. Through the Interim Final Rule, *Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part II*, 86 Fed. Reg. 55,980 (Oct. 7, 2021) (the “Rule”), Defendants have promulgated reasonable, uniform standards that will help prevent abuse of the No Surprise Act’s independent dispute resolution (“IDR”) process for resolving payment disputes between out-of-network providers and payers. The Rule is consistent with the statute and will protect patients and consumers from surprise medical bills and high health costs.

*Amici* submit this brief to assist the court in understanding the nature and extent of these harms to patients and consumers from surprise billing that the No Surprises Act was designed to address, and to explain why the Rule is faithful to the statutory text and Congressional intent. Based on their experience advocating for patients and consumers during the legislative and rulemaking processes, *Amici* explain in this brief why the Rule furthers Congress’ two primary goals in enacting the No Surprises Act: (1) protecting patients from the most pervasive types of surprise out-of-network bills; and (2) lowering health care costs overall. Plaintiffs’ faulty interpretation of the Act’s IDR requirement will frustrate a central purpose of the Act: encouraging more in-network participation by providers and reducing out-of-pocket costs and premiums for patients and consumers.



Because *vacatur* of the Rule will harm the patients and consumers we serve, *Amici* urge this Court to reject Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Rule.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS RESULT IN HIGHER OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS FOR PATIENTS AND INFLATED HEALTH COSTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS.**

As Congress recognized in passing the No Surprises Act, surprise medical bills can be devastating for patients and their families.<sup>5</sup> Patients receive out-of-network bills through no fault of their own when they unknowingly receive care from a provider that is not in their insurance network. Patients usually have no way to choose their physician or hospital in an emergency. Nor can they know whether certain specialists who may treat them during a visit to an in-network hospital—such as anesthesiologists or radiologists—are outside of their plan’s network until after receiving a surprise bill. Patients with chronic or serious conditions, such as those at risk of a heart attack or with cancer, face an elevated risk of receiving out-of-network bills.<sup>6</sup>

#### **A. Surprise Medical Bills Have Harmed Millions of Patients and their Families in Texas and Across the United States.**

Surprise bills are common and have resulted in significant out-of-pocket costs for directly affected patients and higher premiums for privately insured consumers.<sup>7</sup> A patient might receive a surprise bill in an emergency if the closest hospital is outside the patient’s network or if the

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<sup>5</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 116-615, pt. 1, at 52 (2020) (describing stories of patients harmed by surprise medical bills and noting that “[t]he financial liability imposed on patients by surprise medical bills can be staggering”).

<sup>6</sup> Karen Pollitz *et al.*, *Surprise bills vary by diagnosis and type of admission*, Peterson-KFF Health Sys. Tracker (Dec. 9, 2019), <https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/surprise-bills-vary-by-diagnosis-and-type-of-admission/>.

<sup>7</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 116-615, pt. 1, at 53 (summarizing the data on surprise billing and noting that the cost of inflated payment rates from certain provider specialties “are directly felt through higher out-of-pocket expenses and exorbitant surprise bills for out-of-network care, as well as by all consumers who share in rising overall health care costs through higher premiums”).

patient is seen by an out-of-network emergency room physician at an in-network hospital.

According to one study, 18 percent of all emergency visits by patients in large employer plans in 2017 had at least one out-of-network charge that could result in a surprise bill.<sup>8</sup> Another study estimated that one in five inpatient emergency room visits could lead to a surprise bill.<sup>9</sup>

Surprise bills also affect patients when they seek non-emergency care (such as surgery or maternity care) at in-network facilities. Among patients in large employer plans, 16 percent of in-network hospital stays in 2017 included at least one out-of-network charge that could lead to a surprise bill.<sup>10</sup> A separate study found that 20 percent of all patients who had an elective procedure—such as a hysterectomy, knee replacement, or heart surgery—with an in-network primary surgeon at an in-network facility were still at risk of a surprise bill from an out-of-network specialist.<sup>11</sup> Of these, potential surprise bills averaged more than \$1,200 for anesthesiologists and more than \$3,600 for surgical assistants.<sup>12</sup> And over 18 percent of families with in-network childbirths in 2019 potentially received a surprise bill for maternal or newborn care, with one-third of these families facing potential surprise bills exceeding \$2,000.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Karen Pollitz *et al.*, *An examination of surprise medical bills and proposals to protect consumers from them*, Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker (Feb. 10, 2020), <https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/an-examination-of-surprise-medical-bills-and-proposals-to-protect-consumers-from-them/>.

<sup>9</sup> Christopher Garmon & Benjamin Chartock, *One In Five Inpatient Emergency Department Cases May Lead To Surprise Bills*, 36 Health Affairs 177, 177-81 (2017), <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0970>.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*

<sup>11</sup> Karan R. Chhabra *et al.*, *Out-of-Network Bills for Privately Insured Patients Undergoing Elective Surgery with In-Network Primary Surgeons and Facilities*, 323 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 538, 538-47 (2020), <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2760735>.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

<sup>13</sup> Kao-Ping Chua *et al.*, *Prevalence and Magnitude of Potential Surprise Bills for Childbirth*, JAMA Health Forum, at 1 (July 2, 2021), <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2781694>.

These surprise bills add up. A recent study found that Americans owed more than \$140 billion dollars in medical debt and that unpaid medical bills are the largest driver of that debt.<sup>14</sup> Surprise bills can hit low-income consumers the hardest: more than one-fourth of adults are unable to pay their monthly bills or are one \$400 financial setback away from being unable to pay them in full.<sup>15</sup> The added burden of an unexpected medical expense—which could total hundreds or thousands of dollars—can spell financial ruin for many families.

**B. Surprise Billing Increases Health Insurance Premiums and Overall Health Care Costs for Privately Insured Individuals.**

In addition to higher out-of-pocket costs, surprise medical bills increase health care costs, which, in turn, increases premiums for those with private health insurance.<sup>16</sup> One study found that health care spending for people with employer-sponsored insurance would be reduced by 3.4 percent (about \$40 billion annually) if certain hospital-based specialists—anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists, and assistant surgeons—were unable to send surprise bills to patients.<sup>17</sup> Another study found that about 12 percent of health plan spending is attributable to ancillary and emergency services where providers commonly send surprise bills to patients, leading researchers to conclude that policies to address surprise bills could reduce premiums by 1

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<sup>14</sup> Raymond Kluender *et al.*, *Medical Debt in the US, 2009-2020*, 326 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 250, 255 (2021), <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2782187>.

<sup>15</sup> Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., *Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2020*, at 4, 33 (May 2021), <https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202105.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Erin Duffy *et al.*, Brookings Inst., *Surprise medical bills increase costs for everyone, not just for the people who get them* (Oct. 2, 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/surprise-medical-bills-increase-costs-for-everyone-not-just-for-the-people-who-get-them/>.

<sup>17</sup> Zack Cooper *et al.*, *Out-Of-Network Billing And Negotiated Payments For Hospital-Based Physicians*, 39 Health Affairs 24, 24 (2020), <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00507>.

to 5 percent.<sup>18</sup> These studies make clear that, even if not all patients receive a surprise bill, everyone pays the price for this practice through higher health costs and premiums.

## **II. CONGRESS INTENDED FOR THE NO SURPRISES ACT TO PROTECT PATIENTS FROM SURPRISE BILLS AND LOWER HEALTH CARE COSTS.**

Protecting patients from surprise medical bills is at the heart of the NSA. But the law did more than just protect patients from these potentially catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses. The law was also designed to lower health care costs and prevent abuse of the IDR process. The legislative debate over the No Surprises Act and several precursor proposals highlights Congress' consistent and bipartisan objectives of protecting patients from surprise medical bills, reducing health care costs, and, in turn, lowering health insurance premiums. For more than two years, Congress considered four major precursor proposals before ultimately enacting the Act in its current form.<sup>19</sup> While the details of these proposals varied, each bill considered by the committees of jurisdiction would have directly protected patients from surprise medical bills and reduced premiums for consumers. Lowering health care costs was a unifying feature of these proposals, underscoring Congress' intent that any protections should also reduce, or at least not increase, insurance premiums.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Erin L. Duffy *et al.*, *Policies to address surprise billing can affect health insurance premiums*, 26 Am. J. Managed Care 401, 401-04 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.37765/ajmc.2020.88491>.

<sup>19</sup> Other bipartisan legislative proposals, including the STOP Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2019 and the Protecting People from Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2020, included an IDR mechanism and would have allowed consideration of commercially reasonable rates or usual and customary charges (instead of the median in-network rate or qualifying payment amount). As those bills were not advanced in committee or scored by the CBO, they are not discussed here.

<sup>20</sup> See Letter from Sen. Murray & Rep. Pallone to Sec'y Becerra (Jan. 7, 2022), [https://www.help.senate.gov/download/01072022\\_hhs-surprise-billing-letter\\_signed\\_final](https://www.help.senate.gov/download/01072022_hhs-surprise-billing-letter_signed_final).

### 1. Precursor Proposals

#### a. The Lower Health Care Costs Act and No Surprises Act of 2019

Congressional focus on surprise billing began in earnest in 2018 during hearings held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions (“Senate HELP Committee”) on how to reduce health care costs.<sup>21</sup> These hearings led Senate HELP Committee Chair Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) and Ranking Member Patty Murray (D-Wash.) to introduce the Lower Health Care Costs Act,<sup>22</sup> which the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimated would reduce premiums by just over one percent relative to current law.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce debated its own proposal, the No Surprises Act of 2019, which was introduced by Committee Chair Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-N.J.) and Ranking Member Greg Walden (R-Ore.) in July 2019.<sup>24</sup> Here too, the CBO estimated that premiums would be about one percent lower than projected to be under current law.<sup>25</sup> The bill’s sponsors touted the legislation’s protections against surprise bills and premium savings, citing the CBO’s estimate of \$20 billion in savings to

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<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., *How to Reduce Health Care Costs: Understanding the Cost of Health Care in America: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions*, 115th Cong. 832 (June 27, 2018), <https://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/how-to-reduce-health-care-costs-understanding-the-cost-of-health-care-in-america>.

<sup>22</sup> S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, *Senate Health Committee Leaders Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Reduce Health Care Costs* (June 19, 2019), <https://www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/senate-health-committee-leaders-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-reduce-health-care-costs>.

<sup>23</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *Cost Estimate: S.1895, Lower Health Care Costs Act*, at 3 (July 16, 2019), [https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-07/s1895\\_0.pdf](https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-07/s1895_0.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> H. Energy & Commerce Comm., *Pallone & Walden on Committee Passage of No Surprises Act* (July 17, 2019), <https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-walden-on-committee-passage-of-no-surprises-act>.

<sup>25</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *Cost Estimate: H.R. 2328, Reauthorizing and Extending America’s Community Health Act*, at 6 (Sept. 18, 2019), <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55640>.

the federal government in the first decade after its enactment.<sup>26</sup>

b. The Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act

In December 2019, bipartisan leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee—Chair Richard E. Neal (D-Mass.) and Ranking Member Kevin Brady (R-Tex.)—agreed on a strategy to address surprise bills that included an IDR process “[d]esigned to protect against inadvertently raising health care costs.”<sup>27</sup> The agreement led to introduction of the Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act in February 2020. The CBO estimated that this legislation would result in insurance premium reductions of between 0.5 and one percent.<sup>28</sup>

c. The Ban Surprise Billing Act

In February 2020, the House Education and Labor Committee advanced its own bipartisan legislative proposal, the Ban Surprise Billing Act, introduced by Chair Robert C. Scott (D-Va.) and Ranking Member Virginia Foxx (R-N.C.).<sup>29</sup> In a summary of that proposal, the Committee noted that the IDR process “[p]uts in place several commonsense guardrails to prevent the IDR process from leading to higher health care costs and premiums for consumers

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<sup>26</sup> Reps. Frank Pallone Jr. & Greg Walden, *It’s time for Congress to protect patients from surprise medical bills*, The Hill (Nov. 21, 2019), <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/471403-its-time-for-congress-to-protect-patients-from-surprise>.

<sup>27</sup> H. Ways & Means Comm., *Ways and Means Committee Surprise Medical Billing Plan* (Dec. 11, 2019), <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/WM%20Surprise%20Billing%20Summary.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *H.R. 5826, the Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2020, as Introduced on February 10, 2020, Estimated Budgetary Effects* (Feb. 11, 2020), <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56122>.

<sup>29</sup> H. Educ. & Labor Comm., *Committee Advances Bipartisan Solution to Ban Surprise Billing* (Feb. 11, 2020), <https://edlabor.house.gov/media/press-releases/committee-advances-bipartisan-solution-to-ban-surprise-billing>.

and from excessive utilization of the process.”<sup>30</sup> The CBO agreed with this effect, estimating that the Ban Surprise Billing Act would reduce premiums by roughly one percent.<sup>31</sup>

## 2. *The No Surprises Act*

Congress’ commitment to protecting patients from surprise medical bills and reducing health care costs culminated in a bipartisan, bicameral compromise that became the version of the No Surprises Act ultimately enacted as part of the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. On December 11, 2020, the chairs and ranking members of the Senate HELP Committee and the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Education and Labor announced this bipartisan agreement.<sup>32</sup> As with the earlier committee bills, lowering health care costs remained a high priority. The joint statement noted that, “We have reached a bipartisan, bicameral deal in principle to protect patients from surprise medical bills and promote fairness in payment disputes between insurers and providers, *without increasing premiums for patients*.”<sup>33</sup> The CBO confirmed this intent and estimated that the No Surprises Act would reduce premiums by between 0.5 and one percent.<sup>34</sup>

It was no mystery why these bills would reduce premiums. For each bill, the CBO

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<sup>30</sup> H. Educ. & Labor Comm., *Section-by-Section: The Ban Surprise Billing Act (H.R. 5800)*, at 1-2 (Feb. 11, 2020), <https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-02-11%20Ban%20Surprise%20Billing%20Act%20Section%20by%20Section.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *H.R. 5800, the Ban Surprise Billing Act, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Education and Labor on February 11, 2020, Estimated Budgetary Effects* (Feb. 13, 2020), <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56134>.

<sup>32</sup> S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, *Congressional Committee Leaders Announce Surprise Billing Agreement* (Dec. 11, 2020), <https://www.help.senate.gov/ranking/newsroom/press/congressional-committee-leaders-announce-surprise-billing-agreement>.

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

<sup>34</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *Estimate for Divisions O Through FF H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 Public Law 116-260 Enacted on December 27, 2020*, at 3 (Jan. 14, 2021), <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56962>.



consistently assumed that premiums would decline because payments to some providers would be lower than current average rates.<sup>35</sup> The same was true of bills with an IDR mechanism, such as the Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act and the Ban Surprise Billing Act. The CBO analyses of these bills reflected the same conclusion: average payment rates for both in- and out-of-network care would move toward the median in-network rate under the proposed laws.<sup>36</sup> Since the median in-network rate tends to be lower than average rates, premiums would be reduced by up to one percent in most affected markets in most years.<sup>37</sup>

Many *Amici* were highly engaged with lawmakers throughout this legislative process. One of the core principles adopted by coalitions of patient and consumer advocates was that new surprise billing protections should “ensure costs are not simply passed along to patients through higher premiums or out-of-pocket costs”<sup>38</sup> and “hold costs down.”<sup>39</sup> This dual focus on out-of-pocket costs and premiums is also reflected in the comments that many *Amici* and others made to Congress.<sup>40</sup> Based on this history, there is no question that Congress’ intent in passing the No Surprises Act was both to protect patients from surprise medical bills and lower health care costs.

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<sup>35</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *Cost Estimate: S.1895, Lower Health Care Costs Act As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on June 26, 2019* (July 16, 2019), <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55457>.

<sup>36</sup> Cong. Budget Office, *supra* note 35; Cong. Budget Office, *supra* note 28.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.*

<sup>38</sup> ALS Ass’n *et al.*, *supra* note 4, at 2.

<sup>39</sup> Letter from Families USA *et al.* to House Speaker Pelosi and House Minority Leader McCarthy, at 2 (July 10, 2019), [http://nosurprisescampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Consumers\\_Org\\_Letter\\_on\\_Surprise\\_Bills\\_7-10-19.pdf](http://nosurprisescampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Consumers_Org_Letter_on_Surprise_Bills_7-10-19.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> *See, e.g., id.*; Letter from Families USA *et al.* to House Speaker Pelosi and Leaders McConnell, McCarthy, and Schumer (Nov. 12, 2019), <http://nosurprisescampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Surprise-Billing-Sign-On-Letter-11.12.19.pdf>.



### **III. THE RULE PROTECTS PATIENTS AND CONSUMERS BY HOLDING DOWN PREMIUMS AND ENCOURAGING IN-NETWORK NEGOTIATIONS.**

The Rule dutifully follows the No Surprise Act’s mandate and Congress’ intent to rein in health care costs—and, in turn, help limit premiums for patients and consumers. In challenging the Rule, Plaintiffs present an inconsistent and unsound interpretation of the NSA that would undermine these goals by leading to an unpredictable, administratively burdensome IDR system that could award out-of-network providers with payments far above market rates when doing so is not warranted based on the circumstances.

#### **A. The IDR Process Favored by Plaintiffs Will Burden Patients and Families with Higher Premiums, Frustrating a Central Purpose of the No Surprises Act.**

As Defendants explain in their brief, Plaintiffs specifically object to the “instructions that the arbitrator, when choosing between the competing amounts proposed by the insurer and the provider, should look first to a figure known in the Act as the ‘qualifying payment amount,’ or QPA.” Defs.’ Mot. at 2. But the Rule—by instructing arbitrators to select the offer that is closest to the QPA unless there is credible information that this amount is incorrect—is consistent with the statute for the reasons identified in the Rule’s preamble.<sup>41</sup>

Vacating the challenged portion of the Rule, as Plaintiffs seek, would result in an unpredictable and administratively burdensome IDR process, the costs of which will be borne directly by patients and their families in the form of higher premiums. Without the Rule’s presumption that the QPA is the appropriate payment amount in most cases, arbitrators would be left without a clear, consistent way to balance the statutory factors. Both providers and payers would lose the uniform expectations that the Rule’s IDR process establishes, leading to less predictable outcomes and increasing the likelihood of above-market payments to out-of-network

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<sup>41</sup> Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. at 55,984-85, 55,996-98.

providers. Providers would then be incentivized to remain out of network and use the IDR process to obtain a higher payment instead of negotiating for a reasonable, market-based payment. These higher payments, combined with the administrative costs associated with the IDR process, would be passed along to patients in the form of higher premiums. *Vacatur* of the Rule would thus perpetuate the cost crisis that the NSA was expressly designed to remedy.

**B. The Rule’s Emphasis on the Qualifying Payment Amount is Appropriate and Consistent with Congress’ Intent to Lower Health Care Costs.**

Nothing in the Rule prevents IDR arbitrators from considering the statutorily mandated factors and any other information that the parties submit during the IDR process.<sup>42</sup> Rather, the Rule *requires* that arbitrators consider all these factors so long as that information is credible and clearly demonstrates that the QPA is not the appropriate out-of-network payment for a service given the specific circumstances of an individual case.<sup>43</sup>

Prior to promulgation of the Rule, it was assumed that Defendants would issue guidance to arbitrators on how to balance the IDR factors consistent with the No Surprise Act’s requirements. In its February 11, 2020, analysis of the Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act, the CBO noted that “[i]n determining the most reasonable rates, dispute resolution entities would be instructed to look to the health plan’s median payment rate for in-network rate care.”<sup>44</sup> Notably, Plaintiffs themselves understood that Defendants would issue such guidance in implementing regulations. In contrast to its present contention that the IDR requirements are self-executing,<sup>45</sup> Plaintiff Texas Medical Association (“TMA”) wrote a letter to

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<sup>42</sup> See Defs.’ Cross-Motion at 21-23.

<sup>43</sup> See *id.* at 12-13; Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. at 56,128.

<sup>44</sup> See Cong. Budget Office, *supra* note 28.

<sup>45</sup> Pls.’ Motion for Summary Judgment & Mem. in Support Thereof, at 33 [ECF No. 25].

Defendants in September 2021 that included extensive recommendations for how the agencies should implement the IDR process.<sup>46</sup> TMA urged federal officials to “[r]equire the IDR entity (and the physician or provider) to be provided with direction that the IDR entity is not to weigh the QPA more than any other submitted information when picking a party’s offer.”<sup>47</sup>

Plaintiffs’ disappointment that the agencies weighed the factors differently than they would have preferred is an invalid basis for challenging the Rule. And in any event, as Defendants explain in their brief, Plaintiffs’ preferred interpretation is at odds with the text and purpose of the No Surprises Act.<sup>48</sup> Unlike Plaintiffs’ unsound interpretation of the Act’s IDR provisions, the Rule follows the statute by requiring arbitrators to consider the QPA and other factors, and heeds Congress’ intent by encouraging health care payers and providers to negotiate, resulting in increased in-network care at more affordable rates for patients and their families.<sup>49</sup>

**C. The Rule’s Arbitration Standards Will Likely Promote More In-Network Care and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs and Premiums for Consumers.**

Plaintiffs and their supporting *amici* argue that the Rule will jeopardize access to care by forcing providers to accept lower rates or reducing access to in-network care. But these predicted harms are significantly overblown.

First, evidence from states with existing protections against surprise billing suggests that

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<sup>46</sup> Letter from Tex. Med. Ass’n *et al.* to Sec’y Xavier Becerra *et al.*, at 15-18 (Sept. 7, 2021) [Administrative Record 2424-25].

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 16.

<sup>48</sup> Defs.’ Cross-Motion at 30-34.

<sup>49</sup> See Letter from Reps. Bobby Scott & Virginia Foxx to Sec’y Martin J. Walsh *et al.* (Nov. 19, 2021), [https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/chairman\\_scott\\_ranking\\_member\\_foxx\\_re\\_surprise\\_billing\\_protections.pdf](https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/chairman_scott_ranking_member_foxx_re_surprise_billing_protections.pdf); Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. & Sen. Patty Murray to Sec’y Becerra *et al.* (Oct. 20, 2021), <https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pallone%20Murray%20No%20Surprises%20Act%20IFR%20Comment%20Ltr%2010.20.212.pdf>.

a well-designed IDR process that does not incentivize the overuse of arbitration can lead to higher rates of in-network providers.<sup>50</sup> In California, for example, in-network service provision rose and remained high after implementation of the state's law in 2017.<sup>51</sup> Evidence from other laws adopted in states, including Connecticut and New York, also shows out-of-network providers choosing to join payer networks after implementation of surprise billing reforms.<sup>52</sup>

Second, payers have legal and economic incentives to maintain robust provider networks. While the No Surprises Act does not include new standards that require payers to have adequate provider networks, many payers are subject to network adequacy requirements under existing federal and state laws.<sup>53</sup> Where legal requirements might not exist, insurers and plans have market-based incentives to compete for business by offering products with provider networks that ensure access to a broad range of in-network care.<sup>54</sup> Strong network adequacy protections are key to ensuring access to care and help mitigate concerns raised by Plaintiffs and their *amici*.

Third, most providers and facilities do *not* balance bill patients for care. Fewer than half of the providers across medical specialties send out-of-network bills; of those that do, most do so

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<sup>50</sup> See Loren Adler *et al.*, USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy, *Changes in emergency physician service prices after Connecticut's 2016 surprise billing law* (Sept. 23, 2021), <https://www.brookings.edu/essay/changes-in-emergency-physician-service-prices-after-connecticuts-2016-surprise-billing-law/>.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.*

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*; N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., *New York's Surprise Out-Of-Network Protection Law Report on the Independent Dispute Resolution Process*, at 8 (Sept. 2019), <https://www.pacep.net/assets/documents/NYReportontheIDRProcess.pdf>.

<sup>53</sup> Justin Giovannelli *et al.*, *Regulation of Health Plan Provider Networks*, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief (July 28, 2016), <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hpb20160728.898461/full/>.

<sup>54</sup> See Gary Claxton *et al.*, *Employer strategies to reduce health costs and improve quality through network configuration*, Peterson-KFF Health Sys. Tracker (Sept. 25, 2019), <https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/employer-strategies-to-reduce-health-costs-and-improve-quality-through-network-configuration/>.

less than 10 percent of the time.<sup>55</sup> As such, the disputed part of the Rule will have very little impact on most specialty providers.<sup>56</sup> Even if the Rule were to impact specialty providers, hospitals and other facilities have strong financial incentives to ensure that they have sufficient staff for well-functioning emergency departments and operating rooms. Experience suggests that facilities and hospital-based clinicians will ensure access to care by taking necessary actions like making higher payments to out-of-network clinicians.<sup>57</sup> Hospitals and other facilities will then negotiate with payers to secure higher in-network rates to account for these marginal costs.

Finally, in contrast to assertions that the Rule will harm safety net and other providers, lower-cost providers may actually stand to gain under the Rule's IDR provisions. This is because the QPA is the *median* of existing rates, meaning half of facilities or providers were previously paid prices at or below the QPA. As such, many safety-net and other lower-cost providers and facilities could secure rates closer to the QPA, thus improving the financial stability of providers.

## CONCLUSION

The Rule is consistent with the text and purpose of the No Surprises Act and will benefit patients by implementing an IDR process that helps ensure lower health care costs for privately insured Americans. The Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, grant Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and uphold the Rule.

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<sup>55</sup> Jean Fuglesten Biniek *et al.*, Health Care Cost Inst., *How often do providers bill out of network?* (May 28, 2020), <https://healthcostinstitute.org/out-of-network-billing/how-often-do-providers-bill-out-of-network>.

<sup>56</sup> See Kevin Kennedy *et al.*, Health Cost Inst., *Surprise out-of-network medical bills during in-network hospital admissions varied by state and medical specialty, 2016* (Mar. 28, 2019), <https://healthcostinstitute.org/out-of-network-billing/oon-physician-bills-at-in-network-hospitals>.

<sup>57</sup> Chloe O'Connell *et al.*, *Trends in Direct Hospital Payments to Anesthesia Groups: A Retrospective Cohort Study of Nonacademic Hospitals in California 2019*, 131 *Anesthesiology* 534, 534-42 (2019), <https://pubs.asahq.org/anesthesiology/article/131/3/534/17892/Trends-in-Direct-Hospital-Payments-to-Anesthesia>.

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joseph J. Wardenski

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing Brief of The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society and 11 Other Patient and Consumer Advocacy Organizations as *Amici Curiae* in Support of Defendants, and served the document on all counsel of record, using the Court's CM/ECF system.

/s/ Joseph J. Wardenski

## APPENDIX

### Descriptions of *Amici Curiae*

*The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society* (“LLS”) is the world’s largest voluntary health agency dedicated to fighting blood cancer and ensuring that the more than 1.3 million blood cancer patients and survivors in the United States have access to the care they need. LLS’s mission is to cure leukemia, lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, and myeloma, and to improve the quality of life of patients and their families. LLS advances that mission by advocating that blood cancer patients have sustainable access to quality, affordable, coordinated health care, regardless of the source of their coverage.

*The ALS Association* is the only national nonprofit organization fighting amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”) on every front. ALS is a progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells in the brain and the spinal cord. There is no cure for ALS yet. The ALS Association leads the way in research, care services, public education, and public policy. The mission of The ALS Association is to discover treatments and a cure for ALS, and to serve, advocate for, and empower people affected by ALS to live their lives to the fullest. Its chapters provide care services to people living with ALS and their families across the country. The ALS Association’s Certified Centers of Excellence provide state-of-the-art, multi-disciplinary medical care to people with ALS. The Association is also the largest private funder of ALS research worldwide. Lastly, its public policy efforts focus on securing appropriations for ALS research at NIH, DOD, FDA, and CDC and passing legislation to improve the lives of people living with ALS.

The *Cancer Support Community* (“CSC”) is the largest non-profit provider of social and emotional support services for people affected by cancer. CSC believes that all patients should



have access to comprehensive, high-quality, timely, and affordable medical and psychosocial care.

*Community Catalyst* is a leading non-profit national health advocacy organization dedicated to advancing a movement for health equity and justice. The organization partners with local, state, and national advocates to leverage and build power so all people can influence decisions that affect their health. Health systems will not be accountable to people without a fully engaged and organized community voice. That's why Community Catalyst works every day to ensure people's interests are represented wherever important decisions about health and health care are made: in communities, state houses, and on Capitol Hill. Community Catalyst's mission is to build the power of people to create a health system rooted in race equity and health justice and a society where health is a right for all.

The *Crohn's & Colitis Foundation* is a non-profit, volunteer-fueled organization dedicated to finding cures for Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis, and improving the quality of life of children and adults affected by these diseases.

The *Epilepsy Foundation* is the leading national and voluntary health organization that speaks on behalf of more than 3.4 million Americans with epilepsy and seizures. Uncontrolled seizures can lead to disability, injury, or death. Epilepsy medications are the most common use for seizure treatment and is a cost-effective treatment for controlling and/or reducing seizures. So, making access to quality, affordable, physician-directed care, and effective coverage for epilepsy medications critically vital for people living with epilepsy.

*Every Texan* is a nonprofit research and advocacy organization that strengthens public policy to expand opportunity for Texans of all backgrounds. Every Texan was founded by the Benedictine Sisters of Boerne, Texas in 1985 to advance public policy solutions for expanding

access to health care for low-income and other disenfranchised Texans. Since its founding, Every Texan has worked to promote policies that would expand access to affordable and adequate health coverage to improve both health care access for and financial security of Texas families.

*Families USA Action* is a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization with the mission of creating a system that delivers the best health and health care for all people in the United States. On behalf of health care consumers, working people, and patients, Families USA Action has led the No Surprises: People Against Unfair Medical Bills campaign since 2019, and has advocated for legislation and rulemaking that fully protect consumers from surprise bills while ensuring health care costs do not inflate overall. The organization's work on these issues emerged from consumers' reports of unaffordable surprise billing, and from reports by consumer advocates of their inability to address these issues in the past.

*Hemophilia Federation of America* ("HFA") is a community-based, grassroots advocacy organization that assists, educates, and advocates for people with hemophilia, von Willebrand disease, and other rare bleeding disorders. Bleeding disorders are serious, life-long, and expensive. Individuals and families who live with these health conditions require quality and affordable healthcare coverage, and protections from burdensome and unpredictable out-of-pocket costs.

*The Mended Hearts, Inc.* is a community-based, international nonprofit whose mission is to inspire hope and improve the quality of life for heart patients and their families through ongoing peer-to-peer support, education, and advocacy. Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death in men and women, and congenital heart disease is the number one birth defect. Patients and their families, across the lifespan, require access to lifelong care, low-cost

medications, and affordable health coverage to reduce the burden of disease and improve the quality of life.

The *National Multiple Sclerosis Society* works to cure multiple sclerosis (MS) while empowering people affected by MS to live their best lives. To fulfill this mission, the organization funds cutting-edge research, drives change through advocacy, facilitates professional education, collaborates with MS organizations around the world, and provides services designed to help people affected by MS move their lives forward. Access to affordable, high-quality healthcare is essential for people with MS to live their best lives.

*National Patient Advocate Foundation* is dedicated to elevating patient and caregiver voices as part of improving equitable access to affordable quality care, particularly for underserved populations. NPAF is the advocacy affiliate of Patient Advocate Foundation, a national organization that provides direct assistance to families coping with complex and chronic health conditions to help meet their needs for financial and social services advocacy and support.